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Chapter I
Prelude to the Tanzimat: Early Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1774-1839
Introduction
By the end of the eighteenth century the wealth and power of the Ottoman Empire
was dissipating at an ever increasing rate. At one time the Ottoman Empire was
considered the “terror of Europe.”1 Now, at the close of the eighteenth century no major
European power was fearful or even concerned with the military power of the Ottoman
Empire. In the nineteenth century the weakness of the Empire became the essential
concern of its rulers and they embarked aggressively on a series of reform programs
which they hoped would restore its power. The focus of this essay is to examine one of
the most important nineteenth century reform programs undertaken anywhere in the
Muslim world, the Tanzimat. Of special focus will be the policies, adopted by the ruling
elite, and the political ideas, expressed by the intellectuals of the Empire, all with the goal
of restoring the Empire’s power. The Tanzimat took place against the background of a
half century of reform efforts which provide essential background and context for the
Tanzimat itself. And it is to this period that we turn to first.
The Failure to Reform under Selim III (1789-1807)
This period of early reform was marked by a critical event in 1774. In 1774 the
Ottoman Empire and Russia signed a peace treaty which ended a six-year war, 17681774, the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji.2 This treaty marked another defeat in a series of
defeats during the eighteenth century by European nations, and was a catalyst which
brought the Empire rapidly spiraling downward. Kuchuk Kainardji was forced on the
1
2

Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.
Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Perennial, 2002), 404.

Ottomans due to enormous Russian military pressure upon the Empire, and it became
clearer, to at least some Ottoman statesmen, that something had to be done in order for
the Empire to recover and return to its greatness of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Kuchuk Kainardji was, to the Ottoman point of view, calamitous. The most
devastating component of the treaty was expressed in Article III, which transferred the
Crimea, under Ottoman control for nearly two centuries, to the Russian Empire. This
allowed Russia to intervene easier in the Empire, especially in newly independent
Crimea, and, to draw upon an analogy from Russian history, gave Russia an opportunity
to acquire another “warm-water” port.
Kuchuk Kainardji changed the balance of power in the region not only between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire but also with Europe.3 This unbalance discouraged the
Ottoman Empire in its attempt to return erstwhile dominant status in eastern and
southeastern Europe. According to Norman Itzkowitz, “If the Empire were to continue to
exist, a new understanding of its problems and fresh solutions would have to be found.”4
This realization, however, did not fully manifest itself until 1789, when a new Sultan,
Selim III, ascended the throne on April 7th, 1789, coincidently the same year the French
Revolution began.
When Selim III took the throne his predecessor, Abdulhamid I, had left a real
mess for him. The Ottoman Empire was once again involved in a devastating war against
not only Russia, but also against Austria in an attempt to regain the Crimea.5 The second
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Mubadele-An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, Annotated and translated by Norman Itzkowitz and
Max Mote (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 38-39.
4
Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1972), 108.
5
Stanford Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971), 21.
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Russo-Turkish War, 1787-1792, concluded with another debilitating defeat for the
Ottoman Empire.6 Even though the Ottoman Empire was defeated, the end of the war at
least allowed Selim III to concentrate on the problems that were plaguing the Empire,
rather than focusing on new wars with European nations.
The two defeats mentioned above eliminated Ottoman control over the Crimea
and severely incapacitated Ottoman control over the Black Sea. After the two defeats
mentioned above, Selim III realized the Empire needed radical reform. The problem for
Selim, as was for his predecessors dating back a century, was how to reform an Empire
that had undergone relatively few periods of reforms in it’s almost six hundred years of
existence? Selim knew there were two pathways of reform. The first method of reform
was to go back to an imagined “Golden Age.” In this “Golden Age” faith and state, din
ve devlet in Turkish7, were fused together and the shari’ah8 was used as the legal basis of
the state and society. A different approach, which had been hesitantly tried in the
eighteenth century, was to reform the Empire based upon Western models rather than
Islamic models. No matter which direction Selim would decide to reform the Empire,
whether he reformed the Empire by implementing traditional institutions or if he
attempted to reform by introducing Westernize ideas into the Empire, this decision by
Selim would radically change the Empire’s subsequent history. The decision to reform on

6

Ibid.
Shahrough Akhavi, “Dawlah,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 1:353. In Arabic the term is din wa dawla. Dawlah traditionally “refers to the
concept of state and is a central concept in the discourse of the contemporary Islamists.” In Turkish the term is
devlet. This term refers only to state and not government.
8
Norman Calder, “Law” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 450. The idea of law is
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which “refers to God’s law in its quality as divine. “It also refers to God’s law as it is with him or with his Prophet,
or as it is contained within the corpus of revelation”. The Shari’ah displays loyalty and a focus of faith for all
Muslims. Shari’ah is used here but later on in the paper I will use the Turkish equivalent to shari’ah, which is the
term şeriat.
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the basis of the latter model was decided, in part, by Selim III. The implications of this
approach would mean reform along non-Muslim lines, of all aspects of the Empire not
only military and political but social and cultural as well.
The Ottoman elite had long focused on traditional reforms. One key figure who
favored the policy to return to this traditional framework was a late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century Ottoman statesman named Sari Mehmed Paşa. Sari Mehmed Paşa
composed an extensive essay dedicated to the Sultan, in which he advocated that the
Empire reform according to traditional Islamic values in contrast to the radical ideas of
reforming the Empire according to Western ideas subscribed to by Selim.
Sari Mehmed’s full name is Baqqall-oghlu Sari Hajji Mehmed Paşa. He was born
in the city of Istanbul around 1656.9 Other than this there is not much known about the
early life of Sari Mehmed. However, his full name does provide some clues as to his
identity. For example, Sari means, “yellow,” which indicates that either his hair or his
skin was yellow. Sari Mehmed Paşa was an insightful observer of Muslim history and
culture in the early eighteenth century. For a good portion of his adult life, Mehmed Paşa
had been part of the government of the Ottoman Empire. One of the positions he held
was Grand Vezir.10 Within the framework of the Ottoman government there were many
Vezirs, and the most senior of these Vezirs was called the Grand Vezir.11 The duty of the
Grand Vezir was to counsel the Sultan on all matters affecting “The High Ottoman
State.”
9

Sari Mehmed Paşa, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, trans. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1935), 4. According to Wright, the exact date of his birth is not known,
but because of his appointment as an official in a treasury office in 1671, which according to Wright was when he
was twelve to fifteen years of age, we can infer that he was born sometime after 1656.
10
Madeline C. Zilfi, “Vizier,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 306.
11
Ibid., 306-307. This term is derived from the Arabic and Persian “wazir”, “vazir”, and Turkish “vezir”. The term
means “bearer of burdens” or “minister.” The role of a “vizier” was to advise the Sultan in military and civil
matters. The leading deputy was called “Grand Vizier,” whose main responsibility was to advise the Sultan.
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Throughout his writings, especially in his book entitled The Book of Consul for
Viziers and Governors, Sari Mehmed Paşa’s main thesis was the proper way in which
governmental officials should act in order to maintain the wealth and power of the
Ottoman Empire.12 Sari Mehmed Paşa believed the Empire deviated from the correct
path of Islam, and attributed this to its decline. Specifically, Sari Mehmed believed
corruption among the high officials of the Empire was one of the major causes for the
downfall of the Empire.
In his book, Sari Mehmed Paşa wrote extensively on the role of the Grand Vezir.
According to Sari Mehmed, the Sultan must appoint a religiously righteous person to fill
the role of Grand Vezir because of its importance to the Empire and hence the dynasty.13
The Grand Vezir must be a person who will fight passionately to destroy illegal practices
and injustices. The Grand Vezir must also remove all corruption and tyranny from the
government. In addition, oppression and stubbornness must be driven out of
governmental affairs.14 In addition to these duties, Sari Mehmed emphasized other
important aspects of the character of the Grand Vezir. Most important was the need to
treat all people the same no matter how rich, powerful, or educated they were.15 The
Grand Vezir must treat all people equally because the şeriat demands justice. Another
obligation was for the Grand Vezir to have humility. He should not allow fortune or
bribes to sway his opinions in the governing affairs of the Empire. In addition, the Grand
Vezir should not be thinking of the monetary benefits of his job. Instead he should be

12

Sari Mehmed Paşa’s book The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, was written during the early nineteenth
century at a time when the Ottoman Empire was declining in wealth and power. Sari Mehmed wrote this book in an
attempt to awaken the Muslim ruling elite as to why the Empire was declining and how to fix the problems within it.
13
Mehmed, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, trans. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., 64-65.
14
Ibid., 65-66.
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Mehmed, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, 66.
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thinking about creating remedies and solutions to the problems of the Empire.16 This was
one of the two options Sultan Selim III could have chosen in his attempts of reforming
the Ottoman Empire. The ideology of returning to the Golden Age of Islam where faith
and state, din ve devlet, were amalgamated together in order to create a just, harmonious
society based on Islam. After careful deliberation, however, Selim decided this path was
not the correct course of action for the Empire to undergo. He came to this conclusion as
a result of witnessing the devastating defeats inflicted by the European nations upon the
Empire, especially the Crimea.
This decision was not easy for Selim to make as he knew it would anger the
religious establishment, the ulema, and as a new Sultan, he needed the support of the
ulema.17 The support of the ulema was required because they held much of the power
over many of the institutions of the Empire including, the judiciary, the educational
system, and they also held important political positions within the traditional framework
of the government.18 If the ulema were not in favor of the reforms put into place by
Selim III, he would have had an arduous time in successfully implementing these
changes. For this reason the success of the reforms would hinge on their acceptance by
the ulema. Some members of the ulema were opposed to reforming the Empire
according to Western ideas because they came from the infidels. However, not all of the
members of the ulema came to that conclusion. Some members of the ulema cited the

16

Ibid., 68.
Iftikhar, Zaman, “Ulama,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 258-59. Ulama is an
Arabic term which means “man of knowledge” and is the plural form of the word alim. Ulama refers to a class of
men with knowledge of the Qur’an, Hadith, and fiqh.
18
Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,” in The Modern
Middle East, ed. Albert H. Hourani, Mary Wilson, and Phillip Khoury (New York: I.B. Tauris and Company,
Limited, 2004), 29.
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precedents set by Ibn Khaldun,19 who showed through his writings that the early Arab
community withdrew from its original pagan society and assimilated customs, from the
Zoroastrian Persians and the Orthodox Christian Byzantines, such as military
techniques.20 Consequently, Selim was able to gain the support of the majority of the
ulema establishment and implement his ideas of reform.
Selim III realized that a process of reform in accordance with Western models of
secularization and advancement could not fully manifest itself within the framework of
the traditional setting, but must be a gradual process. Hence, the first step taken by Selim
was to reform a segment of the military. The majority of Selim’s efforts went toward
creating a new military system, which was loyal to and only to the Sultan. This new
military was given the title of “The Nizam-i Jedid Army” or “The New Order Army.”21
After the defeats of the Empire, described earlier, there was virtually no resistance
regarding the creation of a new military system. The only difference of opinion
regarding this new system was whether or not it should become part of the old military,
the Janissaries22, or become an independent formation.

19

Fuad Baali, “Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd Al-Rahman,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2: 164. Ibn Khaldun was born in 1332 in Tunis and died in 1406. Ibn
Khaldun gained much attention with his theories about Arab social structures and their processes. Ibn Khaldun
observed the political fluctuations of the Mamluke kingdom in Egypt. Throughout his life he held many prestigious
positions such as secretary of state, ambassador, and was at one time a judge. It was these positions that gave
Khaldun a perspective on social and political dynamics from which he developed his theories of the rise and decline
of states and on the dominant role of the nomads as the state builders and rulers.
20
Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization,” 37.
21
Nizam-i Jedid in Ottoman Turkish meant the new organization, that is the new (military) formation. See Shaw,
Between Old and New, 127.
22
William J. Griswold, “Janissaries,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 367-68. The
Janissaries, or Yeniceri in Turkish, were created in the late fourteenth century. Before the creation of the Janissaries
the military of the Ottoman Empire consisted of free Muslim Ghazi warriors; however the Janissaries were an elite
slave infantry. In return for their military services the members of the Janissaries were given special privileges, such
as tax-exempt status. In addition to fighting wars, another purpose of the Janissaries was to keep the peace between
Muslims and non-Muslims within the borders of the Empire.
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The need to keep the Nizam-i Jedid independent of the Janissaries was clear
because of the corruption of the Janissaries. The traditional system for the military was
based on loyalty. In return for the Janissaries’ loyalty they were given land to live on.
The land received by the Janissaries in return for military service was called a timar.23
When Selim needed more money in order to supply the Nizam-i Jedid, he confiscated a
portion of the Janissaries’ timars and used them to support the Nizam-i Jedid by turning
them into domains.24
The revenue created by Selim through tax-farming allowed him to implement
three key components that were necessary in order for the Empire’s military to be
reformed. These three key aspects of military reform were: a) the Janissary and other
military orders must be restored to their original forms, b) modern methods should be
introduced under the pretext of restoring them in their original forms, and c) these
traditional military institutions and their methods are not capable of reform and therefore
must be abolished altogether and modern methods must be introduced.25 The first
regiment was created in Summer 1794.26 In addition to training with foreign officers,
Selim sent officers to military schools throughout Europe to learn new tactics and
weaponry, with emphasis upon learning how military and naval schools were established
and improving gun foundries and arsenals within the Empire.27 However, as the Nizam-i

23

Ira M. Lapidus, “Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires: The Middle East”, in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John
Esposito (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 377. In exchange for military service, the
Janissaries were given land grants as the form of income; this land grant was called a “timar.”
24
Lewis, The Emergence, 90-92.
26
Ibid.,93.
26
Shaw, Between Old and New, 130.
27
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, First published (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1964), published in a facsimile edition (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1998), 75.
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Jedid forces continued to expand after 1805 problems began to rise.28 For instance, many
of the newer recruits were undisciplined, and therefore were also uncontrollable. As a
result, changes were made to the organization of the military.29 Some changes included
promoting additional officers, and handing out more severe punishments for unruly
behavior.30 Though these changes helped to stabilize the Nizam-i Jedid, resistance and
animosity toward the newly created military system increased. Leading the charge
against the Nizam-i Jedid were the ulema, who saw the changes implemented by Selim as
a violation of Islamic law, and of course, the Janissaries, who were threatened by the
Nizam-i Jedid.
This led to open revolt against Selim’s policy of westernization, in an event
known as the Edirne Incident. The result was that Selim was forced to place command of
the Nizam-i Jedid in the hands of his opponents, which culminated by May 1807 in his
abdication in favor of his cousin Mustafa IV.31
The reign of Mustafa IV, 1807-08, was short lived, a time span of only months.
During his reign, he was merely seen as a puppet of the conservatives who had placed
him on the throne.32 Stating that the creation of the Nizam-i Jedid was a violation of
Islamic law, Mustafa IV ordered the army to be dismantled and all of the schools and
institutions associated with it to be destroyed as well. All of the reforms implemented by
Selim III were replaced by traditional models. This led, in turn, to Selim’s followers,
with the help of a powerful provincial governor, Mustafa Bayrakdar, staging a successful

28

Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 1: Empire of the Ghazis, The Rise and
Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 272.
29
Shaw, Between Old and New, 33.
30
Ibid., 133.
31
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1: 273-74.
32
Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, 433.
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counter-coup in 1808, overthrowing Mustafa IV. This occurred not before Mustafa’s
supporters had managed to assassinate Selim, which then led to the elevation of his
younger brother, Mahmud II to the imperial throne.33
The Reign of Mahmud II: The Reform Movement Continues 1808-1839
Mahmud II would rule the Ottoman Empire as Sultan from 1808 to 1839. During
the initial years of his reign, he was dominated by his Grand Vezir Mustafa Bayrakdar,
since it was Bayrakdar who brought him to power and elevated him to the throne.34
Controlling all of the power, Bayrakdar reinstated the Nizam-i Jedid, but he kept the new
military regime largely out of sight. Yet soon enough the Janissaries became once again
enraged over the creation of a western style military force which threatened their position
and power, and they once again revolted. The end result was the death of not only
Bayrakdar himself but of the Nizam-i Jedid as well.35 After this was done, the rebels
demanded Mahmud to select a new Grand Vezir with a similar ideology as their own.
Mahmud refused to give in to their demands because he believed doing so would only
bring about his demise, as was the case for his brother Selim. Not only did Mahmud not
give in to the rebel’s demands but he also had Mustafa IV killed, leaving no heir to the
throne other than himself.36
Following this development, Mahmud was careful not to openly advocate reforms
which would lead to resistance on the part of the ulema or the Janissaries. He bided his
time, moving carefully on the introduction of any new policies, until he was able to
decisively confront the conservative forces opposed to a policy of non-traditional reform.
33

Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1: 276.
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 2: Reform,
Revolution, and Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1.
35
Ibid., 4-5.
36
Shaw, and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 5.
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The most impressive reforms implemented by Mahmud were those made to the
military despite the revolts of the Janissaries. Mahmud had great changes in mind for the
military; however, he could not implement any of his ideas until the Janissaries were
suppressed once and for all. Mahmud got his chance and did not fail in his attempt to
reform the military according to Western ideas of training and equipment, as Selim III
had attempted. On May 28, 1826 a Hatt-i Sherif37 was ordered and the Nizam-i Jedid was
revived. Mahmud believed the military was the fundamental component to reform in
order to bring the Empire back to opulence. By establishing this as the motive in
reforming the military, Mahmud received permission from the Chief Mufti and the ulema
to carry on with these reforms.38
Even though Mahmud received support from a majority of the people, the
Janissaries were upset by this attempt to replace them. On June 14, two days after the
Nizam-i Jedid began to drill; the Janissaries once again staged a revolt. Contrary to the
last revolt of the Janissaries in 1807, this time the governing officials did not support
their cause.39 Gathering a furious mob, the Janissaries mutinied on June 15 and marched
into the central parade grounds near the palace. It was in this location where the
Janissaries were ultimately annihilated by the Nizam-i Jedid.40 In order to make sure the
Janissaries would never revolt again, all remaining members of the Janissaries were
sought out and executed throughout Istanbul and the Empire. This event ironically
became known as known as the Auspicious Event.41

37

Ibid., 490. A Hatt-i Serif is a decree written or signed by the Sultan or as it is commonly referred to today as an
executive order.
38
Lewis, The Emergence, 79.
39
Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 20.
40
Lewis, The Emergence, 79.
41
Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 20-21.
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Since Sultan Mahmud II was in full control over the government, he could begin
to implement the reforms which his brother Selim had begun during his reign as Sultan.
According to Stanford Shaw, unlike his brother, Mahmud realized:
1) reforms, to be successful, had to encompass the entire scope of
Ottoman institutions and society, not only a few elements of the military;
(2) the only way that reformed institutions could operate was through the
destruction of the ones they were replacing, so that the latter could not
hinder their operation; and (3) the reforms had to be carefully planned
and support assured before they were attempted.42
One of the most significant ideas Mahmud had was his concept of the Ottoman state.
The Ottoman Empire was comprised of many ethnic and religious groups. However, not
all people were treated equally by the Ottoman government. Mahmud embraced the
radical idea that all people within the Empire should have sovereignty in comparison to
the medieval concept of an Islamic Empire. The medieval concept of state was based on
the Islamic religion and on a “social structure based on distinct orders and estates.”43
Mahmud wanted to change this concept. As a result, this was to become one of the most
important debates during the Tanzimat: to allow all people within the Empire irrespective
of race, religion, or language the same rights and freedoms.
In order to achieve this goal of creating an equal society, Mahmud realized that he
had to abolish the millet system. The millet system was the way whereby the Ottoman
Empire organized its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects into separate communities, all
headed by a religious figure. These communities were quasi-autonomous in that they
administered their own educational and judicial systems. In return for this status as
quasi-autonomy, the millets collected taxes for the Ottoman government and helped to

42
43

As quoted in Ibid., 1.
Berkes, The Development, 10.
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enforce social discipline.44 Mahmud believed this system treated non-Muslims as
subordinates rather than as equals.
Furthermore, Mahmud also wanted to establish a new system of governmental
organization to run the Empire. In this attempt, Mahmud used European styles of
organization as a model. One of the positions Mahmud attempted to reform was the
office of the seyhulislam,45 which controlled the ulema.46 In addition to the seyhulislam,
Mahmud also wanted to modify the position of the sadrazam, the head of the military
establishment.47 By doing away with the political role of the seyhulislam, both of the
roles of Sultan and Caliph48 were combined into one position.49 In place of the position
of the sadrazam, Mahmud “…appointed a basvekil (chief minister) and vekils (ministers)
to departments of government that had set duties, functioning under his overall
authority.”50 By doing this, Mahmud began the process of creating a new system of
government and political authority based on Western models rather than traditional
Islamic models. In addition to these changes he made in the Sultan’s bureaucracy,
Mahmud reduced the role of the seyhulislam in regard to governing affairs by reducing
his functions to religious affairs only.51 In addition to the changes in the organization of
the government, Mahmud also made reforms in regard to how the bureaucrats were paid.
44

Lapidus, “Sultanates and Gunpowder,” 386.
Matthew S. Gordon, “Shaykh Al-Islam,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 54. This
is an alternative way of writing seyhulislam. This title first appeared in the late tenth century, well before the
Ottoman Empire was established. The seyhulislam was the “chief mufti” or “jurisconsult” and was the head of the
ulema. Among his duties was to order fatwas or “written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition.” In
addition to his religious and legal duties, the seyhulislam was also an advisor to the Sultan, making the position very
important religiously and politically.
46
Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 8.
47
Berkes, The Development, 97.
48
John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 30-31.
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49
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The system which had been in place for centuries was that officials were paid a fee by
those who used their services. Mahmud eliminated this by instituting a system of direct
salaries paid from the central treasury, which he hoped would involve less corruption
than the previous system.52
After the Janissaries were destroyed and no longer posed a threat to Mahmud’s
attempts to reform the Empire, he was able to continue with little resistance with other
reform policies. There is much debate as to why and how these reforms by Mahmud
would become incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. According to Niyazi Berkes in his
book The Development of Secularism in Turkey:
Aside from the acceptance of the superiority of the material features of
the modern civilization, there was also the recognition of the need to
replace certain traditional habits and customs by others in greater
harmony with the new conditions. The notable element in this insight,
giving to it the colour of Westernization, was the belief that the modern
West was worthy of being taken as a model in the efforts to establish
new ways.53

However, Bernard Lewis has his own interpretation pertaining to the reforms in the
Ottoman Empire. Bernard Lewis wrote in his book The Emergence of Modern Turkey:
The contemporary evidence of the influence of new ideas in Turkey is
largely negative; it could hardly be otherwise. The cultural traditions
and political traditions of the Ottoman Empire were conducive neither to
the formulation not to the expression of new political theories or
programmes. As so often happens, the first appearance of heterodox
ideas in an authoritarian society is known only from refutations and
condemnations; when positive responses appear, they are sporadic and
furtive, and, in Islamic societies especially, assume traditional disguise
of a return to the sanctified past.54
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Both interpretations on the surface appear to be accurate assessments of the
reform policies of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. However, Bernard
Lewis fails to take into full account the affect the French Revolution had on the Ottoman
Empire and how many of the reform policies introduced into the Ottoman Empire were a
byproduct of the French Revolution. The Ottomans did not wrap these newly discovered
principles of governing affairs under a blanket of traditional fundamentalism, as Bernard
Lewis claims would transpire. Rather, the ruling Ottomans and Mahmud in particular,
stressed the importance of moving forward rather than reverting to their Islamic traditions
as was the case proposed by Sari Mehmed Paşa in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. In this regard, Niyazi Berkes appears to more accurately formulate
the changes implemented in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.
The reforms established by Mahmud were the beginning of later reforms. In
addition to the above reforms, Mahmud also reformed other institutions. Mahmud also
reorganized the educational system, which helped implement reforms of the military
establishment and established a definite curriculum for the educational system for
training officers.55 These reforms led to a public announcement of a new policy of
reform. The announcement was in the form of an imperial decree which inaugurated the
Tanzimat Era. This document was called the Hatti-i Sherif of Gulhane.
The Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane
On November 3, 1839 the Tanzimat Charter, better known as The Hatti-i Sherif
of Gulhane, was proclaimed, only several months after Mahmud II had died and his son
Abdul-Mecid had taken over the Sultanate.56 This document was one of the first to
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represent a transformation in the political as well as the social spheres of the dissipating
Ottoman Empire. This document signifies an attempt to modernize the Empire according
to Western political and social ideologies. The Hatt-i Sherif decree was primarily
authored by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of its
conception in 1839.57 The Hatti-i Sherif was the first of many edicts in the next thirtyseven years, which stressed the importance of modernizing the political, social, military,
and educational systems of the Ottoman Empire. This document is the decree which
ushered in a new period of reforms in the Empire. This period is known as the Tanzimat
Era.
Mustafa Reşid Paşa, born in 1800 and died in 1859,58 was one of the first
Ottoman bureaucrats to receive some European education. He dominated the first fifteen
years of the Tanzimat, 1839-1854.59 In addition, between the years of 1835 and 1839
Mustafa Reşid Paşa traveled through much of Europe and learned a great deal about the
west and their ideology.60 While in Europe he was attracted by how liberal there he
governments were in comparison to the Ottoman Empire. He was also Ottoman
Ambassador to Paris and London during the early 1830s, and served as Grand Vezir six
times and as Foreign Minister twice.61 It was during these appointments when he was
able to make the Porte “into an instrument of reform as well as political power.”62
Mustafa Reşid Paşa’s purpose in writing the Hatt-i Sherif was only to introduce the idea
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of complete security for all people and to regulate internal and military expenditures.63
However true this may be, there seems to be a debate among the scholars as to how much
Mustafa Reşid was influenced by Western knowledge of political systems. Berkes writes
in his book, The Development of Secularization in Turkey, that Mustafa Reşid was
influenced by the West in writing the 1839 Hatt. In discussing the influences of the 1839
Hatt, Berkes states:
We do not have to look at the English or the French political impact in
order to discover the origins of the ideas contained in the Tanzimat
Charter and we shall not find them in the Muslim political thinking of
the past.64

However, not all people agree with Berkes’s conclusion that Mustafa’s writing was
influenced by the West. Halil Inalcik, a Turkish Ottoman historian states, “…the
traditional state philosophy was genuinely apparent in it…the basic principle of
legislation, also, was…not in natural rights but in the practical necessity of resuscitating
the Empire.”65 Regardless from where his influence was acquired, Mustafa Reşid is
considered by some scholars to be the real designer of nineteenth-century Ottoman
reforms and hence his title, the “Father of the Tanzimat.”66 Another goal of his was to
prevent the collapse of a multiethnic and multi-religious Empire, which at the time
controlled parts of southern Europe, the Near East of today, and parts of North Africa.
Even though the Ottoman Empire ruled a vast area of territory; at the time of the
document’s introduction into Ottoman politics, the Empire was militarily weak and
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economically stagnate. Moreover, the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans were in
jeopardy of becoming independent due to a rise of nationalism, which was encouraged by
other nations, such as Russia.67 Starting in the 1920s, a succession of revolts took place
in Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria due to which all acquired their sovereignty.68
The Balkans, however, was not the only region in which resistance occurred. Egypt was
also a mounting dilemma for the Ottoman Empire. After British and French troops left
Egypt in 1800, Egypt was left leaderless and in chaos. A Turk from Macedonia named
Muhammad Ali took advantage of the disorder in Egypt, and assumed power.69
Muhammad Ali may have been the leader of Egypt, but Egypt was still under the control
of the Ottoman Empire. Ali ruled Egypt more as a Governor than as a Sultan. Yet in
1831, Ali’s army, led by his son Ibrahim, invaded Ottoman territories in Syria and the
area now called Palestine and Israel and continued to move northward toward the
Ottoman capital, Istanbul.70 This worried the British because they feared that this
invasion could cause the demise of the Ottoman Empire, therefore changing the balance
of power in Europe. In response, the British joined forces with the Ottomans and
“…forced the Egyptian forces out of Syria in 1840.”71
This event demonstrates how feeble the Ottoman Empire had become by the early
nineteenth century, in spite of the reforms that had been carried out by Selim and
Mahmud. Clearly, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a Ghazi state, in which vast
territory was gained through warfare. As a result, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and
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their ruling apparatus, the bureaucrats and the military, knew that the Empire needed to
be altered, rather than being reformed, and thus the 1839 Hatt, was promulgated.72
This document was not simply a call for changes in order to re-establish the
Ottoman Empire as a major power of the world. The ruling elites suspected in some
aspect that the Empire would never again have the capabilities militarily, economically,
or culturally to mirror those of the European powers. As a result, the Hatt was to become
one of the most important documents of nineteenth century history in the Muslim world
as it explicitly lays out a framework for a program of Westernized-inspired reform. A
discussion of this document is thus necessary at this point. The interpretation of this
document will be my account, since I have read the document.
The Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane describes explicit reasons for the decline of the
Ottoman Empire from its opulent status in the previous centuries. One of the primary
causes of the Empire’s decline was due to a lack of adherence to the şeriat. The
document stated, “…countries not governed by the laws of Şeriat cannot survive”.73 This
document also stated that there was no effective administration of the Ottoman
government and its provinces, and new legislation was required in order to reverse the
decline brought about by such inadequacies.
There were many other reasons for the decline of the Empire that were implicitly
acknowledged throughout this document, one of these being overexpansion. At its
height, the Empire ruled an immense amount of territory, which expanded into three
continents. Due to this fact, the Empire was always waging war on one of its borders, for
example, against the Hapsburgs in Europe, the Safavid Empire, and later against
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Muhammad Ali in Egypt. Military success had always gone hand in hand with the
Ottomans, but by the eighteenth century this had changed and the Empire was on the
defensive on all its borders.
This leads to the next reason why the Empire was declining and was perceived as
being weak. Even as the Empire was declining, the nations of Europe were undergoing
dynamic change as a result of the cumulative effects of the scientific revolution, the
Enlightenment, the industrial and democratic revolutions, all fueled in part by the influx
of specie from the Western Hemisphere, the growingly world-wide mercantile dominance
of the Europeans, and the evolutions of Western thought.74 The Ottoman Empire, in
common with all the societies of Eurasia outside of Europe, never went through such a
combination of changes. As a result, the Empire did not modernize technologically,
militarily, politically, economically, or culturally. While the nations of Europe were
developing into stronger and more formidable societies, the Ottomans were in a condition
of stasis.
There were three radical remedies proposed by the Hatt-i- Sherif. The first of
these remedies introduced by this document was that it guaranteed “security of life,
honor, and property,” for all people. The key phrase is “for all people.” The Hatt-iSherif propounded that all people, no matter their religion, language, or culture, should
enjoy these fundamental freedoms. The second solution was a “regular system of
assessing taxes.” A regular system of taxes would alleviate some of the financial
instabilities that existed in the Empire at this time. This new tax system stated that every
74
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person should pay taxes and these taxes would be assessed according to a person’s
wealth. A regular system of taxing would also decrease the likelihood of corruption, a
long term goal incidentally shared for that matter by traditional reformers such as Sari
Mehmed Paşa in book The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors.75
The last policy prescribed by this document was directed at the military. The
document guaranteed, “…an equally regular system for the conscription of requisite
troops and the duration of their service.” This document stated all people should
participate in the military. Lastly, the document stated that each member of the military
should serve between three and five years, as opposed to serving lifelong tenures with the
military.76
Even though these ideas were not from Islamic sources, they did have their
advantages. These ideas on reform created a loyal population, which because they owned
property, would fight and defend the Empire at all costs to preserve these principles. In
addition, these ideas of a new system of taxation also created a stable financial base,
which would create a better economy. The reforms to the military were also beneficial
because they caused the army to become more modern, meaning a stronger military with
more capabilities in tactics and technology.
The ideas and reforms established by the Hatt-i Sherif all marked a fundamental
departure from Islamic/Ottoman political practices. From this point on, it appears that
Islam was no longer the answer to all the problems of the Empire. Instead the answers to
these problems were heavily dependant upon modernization and Westernization, and the
Empire looked toward Europe as a model to follow. However, not all subjects were fond
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of these new policies. The ulema and the seyhulislam specifically would not want to
accept these reforms since they were based on European principals, and not those of
traditional Islamic sources. So then why did they? They had no choice due to the
reforms regarding the office of the seyhulislam implemented earlier by Mahmud. They
had been stripped of their power and control over the affairs of the government and were
left without a platform from which to convey their dissent.
The Hatt was a decisive moment in the long standing objective of the Ottoman
rulers to increase the wealth and power of the Empire. It inaugurated the Tanzimat, and
committed the Empire to a program of westernized reform.
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Chapter II
Official Reformers: Statesman and Official Reform of the Tanzimat Era
Introduction
Before engaging the topic of the central political thinkers of the Tanzimat it is
important to define what the Tanzimat meant in regard to the Ottoman Empire. The word
Tanzimat means “reorganization” or “reordering.” This period began in 1839 with the
Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane, and ended in 1876 when a constitution was promulgated. The
Tanzimat was an attempt for the Empire to reform its institutions in order to modernize or
Westernize the Empire and its society, and thus preserving the Empire in a world which
was becoming ever so dominated by Europe.77 In other words this was an attempt to
bring about a program of Westernization in order to preserve the Empire with Islamic
reform and revival not being its primary objective.78 According to Stanford and Ezel
Shaw it was to:
…include the right and even the duty to regulate all aspects of life and changing
the concept of Ottoman reform from the traditional one of attempting to preserve
and restore the old institutions to a modern one of replacing them with new ones,
some imported from the West.79

Furthermore, Tanzimat is used commonly in modern Turkish and Western terms as a
noun meaning “reforms.” Regarding Ottoman history, however, Tanzimat has been used
in three senses: first to designate the 1839 Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane and the 1856 Hatt-i
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Humayun; second, to discuss the totality of reforms from 1839 to approximately 1876;
and third, to describe Ottoman history in its entirety.80
The Tanzimat was a period of time which saw a transformation of the Empire
from a traditional Islamic framework to a more Westernized form of government. The
reforms which were discussed earlier, by Selim and Mahmud, were also an attempt to
reform the Empire; however those reforms established a more centralized government.
This centralized government quickly became very powerful and the people of the Empire
were not given any new rights or liberties. During the Tanzimat there was a dramatic
shift in reforming the Empire, which emphasized improving the lives of the people by
guaranteeing them new rights and reformulating the government so that it was a more
responsive and effective government.
Official Reformers of the Tanzimat
In the two decades following the promulgation of the Hatt-i Sherif there were
several significant figures, all of whom became Grand Vezir. They were Ali Paşa, Fuad
Paşa81, Midhad Paşa82, and Khayr al-Din Paşa. Collectively, they dominated the
government of the Empire during the Tanzimat and carried out reforms in the spirit of the
Hatt-i Sherif that they deemed important or necessary. This chapter will consider these
men’s reforms. These figures can conveniently be divided into two groups: the early and
the later official reformers.
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The early reformers were represented by Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa who were the dominant
government officials as Grand Vezir of the Empire during the1850s and 1860s. In 1856
the two, along with Sultan Abdulmecid, promulgated a new edict on February 18, 1856,
the Hatt-i Humayun.83 This document was an extension of the 1839 document the Hatt-i
Sherif of Gulhane in that it guaranteed the rights of the people established in the Hatt-i
Sherif of Gulhane.84 Furthermore, this document abolished the tax farming system and
bribery of government officials.85 In addition, there was an attempt to create equality for
all subjects. For example, the Hatt-i Humayun wanted to reform the court system in
which the courts would be mixed ethnically in order to take care of a greater proportion
of cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims. There were other statements regarding
equality such as, equality of taxation, all subjects were allowed to enter military schools
regardless of religion and race and they were to be equal in regard to military service and
administration of justice.86 Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa were instrumental in creating this
document and showed their willingness, at least on the surface, to continue the reforms
began by their mentor, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, in 1839.
Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa
Ali Paşa was born in 1815 and died in 1871.87 He was involved in government
service literally all his life. Ali was very conservative and less intruding in nature. He
took as long as possible in making his decisions so that he could analyze all alternatives
and the consequences, which could occur. He believed in gradual reform, while others
wanted drastic changes in a relative short period of time. He also believed that the
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Empire should defend itself aggressively from European intervention in order to preserve
its geographic integrity and its Islamic character. Ali Paşa believed Islam was the official
tradition of the Empire although he pledged to keep the affairs of the state and the affairs
of Islam separate.88 He did not believe a constitution should be introduced into the
Empire, but he did support better relations between Muslims and non-Muslims by giving
all subjects the same freedom no matter what religion or race they were in regard to
education, military service, and government positions.89 Ali Paşa also wanted to improve
the schools in the Empire, and he wanted these schools to be religiously and ethnically
mixed. In addition, he also sought a new civil law code based on Western models. This
should be drawn up with an attempt for more mixed tribunals and for mixed courts,
composed of ten Muslims and ten non-Muslim Ottomans, which would help to improve
upon Christian-Muslim relationships.90
Ali Paşa’s colleague and collaborator during this time period was Fuad Paşa.
Fuad Paşa, also born in 1815, received his higher education at the military medical
school. Once his education was completed, he transferred to the translation office. With
this training he was nominated to the Ottoman embassy in London, and then in 1852 he
was appointed to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he would hold
five times during his political career. Fuad Paşa was also highly Europeanized and he
spoke French fluently.91
Fuad Paşa’s views were different than Ali Paşa’s views, though they had more
similarities than differences. Similar to Ali Paşa, Fuad believed that reform was
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necessary in the Empire, but they disagreed on the pace of reform. Fuad believed in a
stronger and quicker reform policy. Similar to Ali Paşa, Fuad opposed European
intervention in the affairs of the Empire, because he, like most Ottoman statesmen, was
concerned with preserving Ottoman integrity and its ability to solve each problem as it
occurred in accordance with a planned approach firmly under the control of the Ottoman
government without interference from Europe.92 Both Ali and Fuad believed in further
secularizing the government, and wanted a greater degree of popular participation in
government.93 Popular participation is a form of government whereby the
representatives, elected by the people, control the government.94 And they both wanted
to keep the Council of Ministers free from interference from the Sultan and the palace.
Furthermore, the two officials believed a new system for public administration was
needed and that the infrastructure of the Empire needed to be improved, such as roads
and railroads.95 Unlike his counterpart, Ali Paşa, Fuad was less cautious, and more
Western in implementing reforms. Lastly, Fuad wanted stronger provincial government,
in order to fight off “nationalist separatism” encouraged by European powers.96
The Hatt-i Humayun was promulgated by Ali and Fuad Paşas’ but was seen as a
byproduct of British interference into Ottoman affairs. In fact the Hatt-i Humayun, was
largely dictated to the Ottoman government by the British ambassador, Stratford
Canning.97 The purpose of the Hatt-i Humayun was to re-establish the rights and
guarantees of the 1839 Hatt, including the guarantee of security of life, honor and
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property. In addition, the Hatt-i Humayun abolished tax farming and bribery.
Furthermore, it went on to bring in many European practices into the Empire, such as the
establishment of banks and codification of laws.98 By far the most important attribute of
this document was that there would be “no inequality on grounds of religion, language, or
race, in regard to the holding of government offices, entry into government schools, the
payment of taxes or the rendering of military service.”99 Many political and social elites
viewed this document as a threat. According to them, the document threatened Muslim
dominance over other religious sects of the Empire and singled out Christian
communities by giving them rights and political privileges denied to some Muslims. The
Muslim elites saw this document as a conspiracy with Europe in order to elicit European
help, especially that of Great Britain.100
The above leads to a discussion pertaining to the Eastern Question and the
position of the non-Muslim millets and their relationship with the reforms. For Russia,
this meant that these millets would be more autonomous or even independent from
Ottoman control. However, this view was drastically different than that of Great Britain,
which had its own objectives. According to Stratford Canning the question of equality
was not for all individuals regardless of their culture as the Ottoman government insisted
it was. Rather Canning wanted equality of the millets as “corporate communities.”101
Canning was not concerned with the Ottoman Empire on a social or cultural basis.
Instead, his only interest was to ensure that it maintained peace and that it stayed out of
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the hands of other European nations, especially France and Russia.102 This is why the
Ottoman elites had reason to be wary of the Hatt-i Humayun. It was clearly created by
Great Britain in its attempt to keep the Ottoman Empire in existence and to maintain the
equilibrium of power to further British interests in the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean.
As a result of the Hatt-i Humayun, the millet system underwent fundamental
reforms. Essentially, the millets were given more autonomy in the sense that lay bodies
were given more direct power over ecclesiastical affairs. Furthermore, these
communities were allowed to elect representatives from their population in order to run
such affairs as “…to legislate, execute and judge all the religious, administrative,
financial, educational, and civil affairs of the community.”103 The outcome of this was
that these millets transformed into largely autonomous societies running their own affairs
under the overall protection of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Hatt-i Humayun had
little effect on the Muslim population since there was no distinctive Muslim millet
system, as the Empire was a Muslim Empire by definition and the Muslim community
was, in effect, under the authority of the Ottoman bureaucracy.
Under the leadership of Ali and Fuad Paşa, the Empire continued to reform
according to Western models. Another area, in which these two men initiated reform,
was in the legal realm. Even though the 1839 Hatt announced loyalty to the şeriat, new
secular laws were introduced into the Empire. One of the most important laws created
was a land law which was promulgated in 1858, which coincidentally was the same year
Muhammad Ali of Egypt implemented his own land law. The goal of this law was to rid
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the countryside of all its problems by implementing Western reforms and making the
countryside of the Empire similar to that of the better-off Europeans. “The general trend
of the reforms was to abrogate the earlier agrarian relationships and progressively to
extend and confirm the rights of use, of possession, and of ownership.”104 As mentioned
earlier, Mahmud II was able to abolish the timar system, but was not able to abolish the
tax-farming practices of the Empire. As a result, tax-farmers and leaseholders controlled
a majority of the land and had all of the rights involved with the land including disposal
and succession of the land. The people who actually worked the land were reduced to
share-croppers or hired laborers and were under control of either the tax-farmer or the
lease holder. As a result, a landlord class was created, which benefited the most from the
reforms.105 What this new law tried to do was to increase the power of the government
by lessening the role of large landowners in the countryside.106 In effect the land law
formed a new class of wealthy landowners and centralized the power of the government,
rather than allowing the people to own and control their own land. This was not what
was intended when the Hatt-i Humayun was passed, which promised to protect people’s
property.
Another legal reform implemented by Ali and Fuad Paşa was the process of
codifying the laws. A basic contradiction was present in the 1839 Hatt in that it made a
promise to remain loyal to the şeriat; however, it also stated that the Empire should
implement new laws. And it further stated that misrule was a byproduct of laws not
being written down or accessible to the people.107 This was a problem for the two
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statesmen because the şeriat was not a codified body of law. The kanuns108 were written
and promulgated, but they were not accessible to the people. Thus, none of the laws or
legal codes which were already in existence satisfied the 1839 Hatt. When creating new
legal codes and laws, Ali Paşa decided to use the French civil code as a model.109 A
consequence of this process was the creation of mixed courts. As mentioned earlier, the
first mixed court was composed of ten Muslim and ten non-Muslim Ottomans. These
were the first secular courts in the Empire which were outside the jurisdiction of the
seyhulislam. This led to the promulgation of the first secular codes in 1850, which were
commercial laws, followed in 1860 by an addition to the 1850 commercial law.110 These
acts of codification had three major effects. The first was that secular courts began to
expand their jurisdiction over the şeriat courts. Second, there was a movement to
reorganize the judiciary system of the Empire so as to separate the functions of the
secular and religious courts. Finally, there began a process of codifying areas of law
which were covered by the şeriat.111 This was important because this showed that both
Ali and Fuad Paşa were attempting to follow the 1839 Hatt. This process of codifying
and creating new laws gave people greater access to the laws and thus allowed more
people to become aware of the activities of the government.
In the context of modernizing the şeriat, there was an attempt to create a penal
code in order to ensure the promises of the 1839 Hatt to protect “life, property, and
honour.” The first penal code was enacted back in 1840. This code confirmed the
principle of equality and followed the principle that no one would be punished without a
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trial and would be given sentences by the court. The penal code of 1840 also ruled that
trials would be public and that the impartiality of the judges was essential.112 But this
penal code fell short because it omitted several crucial components. It failed to define and
classify criminal deeds. This led to another attempt to create a penal code in 1851. But
this effort was also considered inadequate. After this failure, yet another effort to create a
penal code occurred in 1858, called the Reform Edict. It was modeled after the French
Penal Code of 1810 and was “…the first introduction of a Western legal formulation in
the field of public law.”113 This penal code lasted from 1858 until 1918. It was
distinguished from the others in that it included disciplinary provisions to deal with the
issue of equality for all. This penal code stated people should not be punished for an
unspecified reason, and it established a principle of individual responsibility.114 These
laws are important to analyze because they constituted the attempt of the ruling elite to
try to put into effect the promises which were made in the 1839 Hatt and again in the
Hatt-i Humayun in 1856.
The crucial component to examine is the degree of political, social, and cultural
institutional separation between the former traditional Islamic Empire and the new
Westernized Empire, which was coming under greater European political and intellectual
influence every year. As pointed out above, in this phase of the Tanzimat the Empire was
greatly influenced politically by Great Britain. Great Britain was able to pressure the
ruling elites of the Empire to implement new ideas of freedom and equality, especially
for the Christian millets. Great Britain was able to do this because it had assisted the
Empire in defeating the military forces of Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim of Egypt
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in the 1830s and came to the defense and support of the Empire again in the 1850s. The
Empire was also heavily influenced by France and especially by French law, used as the
preferred model to implement new laws and legal codes. This acceptance of Westernize
laws and a European style bureaucracy was a radical departure from traditional Islamic
models of governing, in which faith and state, din ve devlet, functioned as one institution
rather than as two separate ones.
The Ottoman Empire had a struggle ahead, not only in terms of reforming the
Empire to restore its power, but also in becoming modern without losing Islamic
traditions. How could the Empire reform itself and become a modern entity without
losing its Islamic traditions? The assumption by many is that in order to be considered a
modern state/nation one must be secular, and those that are not secular are not modern in
the sense of this definition. But this does not take into account historical perspectives and
experiences. For example, James Gelvin writes that secularism in the West developed as
a result of its historical experience, especially its involvement in religious wars which
took the lives of so many people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a
result of this experience in religious wars, Gelvin states that the West made a separation
between faith and state in order to decrease the number of wars.115 By the seventeenth
century, with the Treaty of Westphalia, European nations decided that the state was
sovereign and rulers may regulate religion within their realm, but would not stipulate or
force specific religious commitments. This led ultimately to the emergence of an
increasingly secularized state and society, which in turn became the basis on which
modern western nations developed. As a result of this ideology, the definition of
secularism has been defined as seen through the eyes of the West as a paragon of
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modernity. As defined by Berkes in his book The Development of Secularism in Turkey,
secularization is, “a sociological process which takes place as a result of factors beyond
the control of individuals. A doctrine of secularism involves individual ideas, attitudes,
beliefs, or interest.”116 Even though this worked in the West, it is ethnocentric to assume
this is the formula to modernity that all modern nations must adhere to.
The Ottoman Empire did not pursue this pathway when it was attempting to
reform its institutions to become modern and reformed, especially in the sphere of
political authority. One of the major differences between modernization in the West and
in the Ottoman Empire was due to their historical experiences. Religion in the Ottoman
Empire always had a dominating role in the political sphere and in political authority.
Western European governments had come to see religion as a major cause of wars
between nations and had decided to separate the two. The Ottoman Empire had a
different perspective on faith and state. In their view they were not separated, as was the
case in the West. Nevertheless, it is not accurate to assume that they are not modern, for
the word modern is defined according to a Western ideology. The Empire simply went in
a different direction in trying to achieve its goal of becoming modern and reformed. The
Empire did attempt to follow the Western model of modernity in that reforms were
implemented which limited the political role of the seyhulislam in an attempt to divorce
faith and state. However, the Empire did not want to lose its traditional ideology, and the
Empire was stuck in the stages of transformation.
The reforms implemented by Mustafa Reşid in the form of the Hatt-i Sherif and
those of Ali and Fuad Paşa in the Hatt-i Humayun in 1856 were important steps in the
process of Westernization and secularization, but they failed to bring about a complete
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transformation in the Empire’s government and its political establishment. Never once
during the Tanzimat was there an established framework which stated how the
government should expound its political authority onto the people. The relations between
the governing and the governed, the ruler and his administration, and the legislative and
the ruler were never established. This led to a government that was unstable and lacked
homogeneity, even though it was becoming more secular in appearance. 117
The problem of the lack of homogeneity in the Empire led it to attempt to
continue the process of reform in regard to establishing an even more Westernized form
of political authority. The next series of reforms were made to the Supreme Council.118
In 1868 this council was separated into two councils. The first being the Board of
Judicial Enactments, and the other was the Council of State. The former was placed in
charge of the secular courts and became the most powerful judicial council. This council
was headed by Cevdet Paşa. The latter of the two councils became the source of
inspiration for the constitutional movement, and was headed by Midhad Paşa. (More on
these two figures will follow.) The purpose of this new organization according to Sultan
Abdulaziz was that, “The new organization is based upon the separation of the executive
power from the judicial, religious, and civil powers.”119 It would appear that this was an
attempt to create a new political authority based upon secular ideas, with the ultimate
goal being to establish a constitutional form of government. But was this really the case
or was there an outside force applying pressure upon the Empire to continue reforming
the Empire?

117

Berkes, The Development, 156.
Lewis gives this council another name, the High Council for Judicial Ordinances (Lewis, The Emergence, 99).
This council was initially created by Mahmud and was created for the purpose of planning and carrying out reforms.
119
As quoted in Berkes, The Development, 157.
118

35

In 1867 a note was given to the Ottoman government by the French government.
This note suggested that the Ottoman government should involve itself in a more active
plan of reform.120 The Sultan, Abdulaziz, upon hearing this became angry with this
further European intrusion into Ottoman affairs. He had no choice, however, but to
follow the suggestions on the note. The Sultan had no option because of the position of
the Empire. The treasury of the Empire was empty, the army was unpaid, and the
economy of the Empire was in disarray.121
Once again the Empire was pressured by Europe, through the 1867 note, to
continue a policy of reform in accordance to Western ideas. But the reforms that the
Empire implemented were those initiated by the West and not those on the Empire’s own
determination. This furthered the divergence between the traditional Islamic framework
and the new Empire under Western reforms in that, the courts were further subjected to
secularization and the role of the executive became separated from the other realms of
government. Yet the most important aspect to keep in mind is the mention of the
constitutional movement, which will be discussed below.
The constitutional movement was to have important and lasting effects on the
subsequent history of the Empire, almost to the very end of its existence in 1924. Of
those Ottomans who supported the idea of constitutional government and worked to bring
it about, two individuals stand out, Midhad Paşa and Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, and it is to
their examination that I will now turn.
Midhad Paşa, Khayr al-Din Tunisi and the Climax and End of Constitutional
Reform
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The Empire was being rapidly brought to destruction…The only remedy
that he could perceive, lay, first in securing a control over the Sovereign
by making the Ministers…responsible to a national popular
Assembly…122

The passage quoted above was authored by Midhad Paşa, who was destined to be
one of the most important official reformers of the Tanzimat. Midhad was born in 1822 in
Istanbul. His parents gave him the name of Ahmed Shefik and provided him with a
traditional Muslim education. This is proven from the fact that at the age of ten he
memorized the Qur’an, and henceforth was given the designation of “Hafiz Shefik,” one
who has memorized God’s word. His good work and talent then landed him with his
current name, Midhad. In 1840 he was transferred to the Grand Vezir’s office to which
he was to be attached on and off for the remainder of his government service 123
Between the years of 1842 and 1847, he held several positions in the government.
One of the most important was involved with the Supreme Council of Judicial
Ordinances, where he stayed until 1859 and held the position of chief secretary. After
taking several other governing positions throughout the Empire, Fuad Paşa invited
Midhad back to Istanbul to work with him to draft a new vilayet law, or a new province
law, which was modeled after French examples. This new law was created in order to
reform the provincial administration.124 The objective of this law was to combine central
control with local authority in an attempt to keep the Empire together.125 This vilayet law
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was to be tested in the newly created province of Tuna126, and on October 13, 1864,
Midhad was appointed its governor. While there he began a program of reform,
including producing three thousand kilometers of roads and one thousand four hundred
bridges.127 Furthermore, Midhad also aggressively built public buildings and schools,
and, as well, established state farms equipped with European machinery. Midhad also
was able to promote the economy of the area by building several small factories and he
also created “agricultural credit cooperatives,” which lent out money at low interest rates.
On another front as governor, Midhad attempted to improve relations between the
Ottomans and the Bulgarians through just rule and ethnically and religiously mixed
schools. However, this was to no avail due to developing Bulgarian nationalism, which
led to rebellions and which Midhad dealt with severely. Even though Midhad struggled
with the rise of Bulgarian nationalism, the vilayet law was seen as a success and Midhad
was summoned back to Istanbul in 1867.128
Once back in Istanbul, Midhad’s political career continued successfully. After the
Supreme Council was dismantled and a Council of State and the Judicial Council were
created to replace it, Midhad was placed in charge of the former.129 The role of the
Judicial Council was to discuss and draft laws. However, due to tensions with Ali Paşa,
the Grand Vezir at that time, Midhad did not maintain this position long. In fact, in 1869
he was sent to Baghdad as Governor.130 The tension was a result of Midhad not
enthusiastically supporting the policies of Ali Paşa, who believed his protégé should
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accept everything that he said, which Midhad did not do.131 Even though this was clearly
a demotion, Midhad made the most of the opportunity. While in Baghdad, Midhad
effectively applied the “new tax systems, land distribution to peasants, dams for irrigation
and navigation, and improvements in cultivation methods…”132 In addition, Midhad had
some of the streets in Baghdad paved, built a bridge, built cotton and wool mills,
established public schools and military schools, and started the first newspaper in Iraq, to
name several of the reforms Midhad introduced while Governor of Baghdad.133
While Midhad was in Iraq, Ali Paşa continued to hold the position of Grand
Vezir. Ali’s reign as Grand Vezir would end when he died on September 7, 1871.134
This left a vacancy, and, due to his dedication to reform, Midhad was named Grand Vezir
in the summer of 1872. But from the beginning of his reign as Grand Vezir, Midhad
encountered problems brought on in large measure by his personality. He was known for
his brusque speech, as was seen earlier with his tension with Ali Paşa. This type of
speech brought him many enemies, and he quickly grew out of favor with Sultan
Abdulaziz. Abdulaziz thought Midhad was going to allow him to continue to rule under
the traditional system of Sultanic absolutism. This, however, was not the case. Midhad’s
goal was to bring about a constitutional style of government, which would end absolute
rule of the Sultan.
After this short reign as Grand Vezir, Midhad knew that change was needed if the
constitution was to be promulgated. In hindsight, Abdulaziz had to be removed from his
position due to his determination to exercise an absolutist style of control. Midhad
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attempted to persuade Abdulaziz to support the promulgation of the constitution in an
attempt to avoid a movement which would lead to his deposition. However, Abdulaziz
did not want to renounce his absolute authority, which he would have been forced to do
so if the constitution were to be promulgated. Midhad, along with other followers, led
the movement against the Sultan.135 On May 30, 1876 after having secured the support
of the important government officials, including the seyhulislam, Midhad Paşa forced the
addiction of Abdulaziz from the Sultanate and placed Murad V onto the throne.136 After
the deposition, Midhad was once again selected to the position of President of the
Council of State, in effect, the most powerful minister, where he could continue to reform
in accordance with his ideas on constitutionalism.137
A week after the succession of Murad V, Midhad called a meeting to discuss the
proposals for creating and passing the constitution. While this meeting was occurring,
three distinct groups were formed. The first group included those in favor of
promulgating a constitution immediately. The second group was those who were
opposed to the creation of a constitution. The last group incorporated those who shared
the opinion of the second group, but were not vocal in their opinions.138
One of the opponents of the idea of the constitution was the Grand Vezir, Rustu
Paşa.139 He claimed the Empire was not suited for a constitutional style of government.
He argued the people were not smart enough to enjoy the liberties, which would be
afforded to them by a constitution. Rustu Paşa concluded people would misuse their
135
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liberties and that the end result would be anarchy. In addition to the arguments made by
Rustu Paşa, another popular argument against establishing a constitutional government
revolved around the role of minorities. Some anti-constitutionalists believed if minorities
were elected into a representative body, they could pass laws favoring their cause, such as
limiting the role of the şeriat. These anti-constitutionalists concluded a constitutional
government was not allowable on religious grounds. Overall, the meeting showed the
Grand Vezir and the ulema were not going to favor a constitution. Even the new Sultan,
Murad V, was not helpful in promoting the creation of a constitution, even though he was
placed onto the throne because he was considered a pro-constitutionalist.140
After this, it appeared as though there was a need for change in the Sultanate for
the pro-constitutionalists, since the purpose of placing Murad on the throne was to
support the promulgation of a constitution. Fortunately for the pro-constitutionalists,
Murad grew mentally ill shortly afterwards. Some believed he became mentally ill due to
the death of Abdulaziz, who was found with his wrists slit a few days after his deposition.
Murad was examined by several doctors, and it was deemed that his illness was
incurable. The next heir to the throne was Murad’s younger brother, Abdulhamid II.
Before he was officially placed onto the throne, Midhad spoke with him to assure that he
would be sympathetic to his and the Young Ottomans liberal cause. The Young Ottomans
were a group of intellectuals who wanted to reform the Empire by promulgating a
constitution and ending absolutism.
Midhad showed Abdulhamid a draft of the constitution, which he and the other
pro-constitutionalists were going to introduce. Upon viewing the document, Abdulhamid
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gave his support to constitutionalism, and he was placed on the throne once Murad had
been officially deposed on August 31.141
Once Abdulhamid became Sultan the argument over the constitution changed
dramatically. The argument was no longer between pro-constitutionalists and anticonstitutionalists, rather the new arguments were among separate groups within the proconstitutionalists. Though all individuals involved in this argument desired for a
constitution to be promulgated, each group had its own perspective of what should be and
should not be in the constitution. For the purpose of this paper, the argument to be
analyzed here will be the different views of Abdulhamid and Midhad Paşa, who during
their argument was Grand Vezir, 1876-1877.
Though both Abdulhamid and Midhad Paşa wanted a constitution to be
promulgated, they had different perspectives regarding the document. The arguments
between the two individuals were “the respective prerogatives of the ruler, the
government, and the parliament on executive, legislative, and religious affairs; and the
particular issue of centralized versus decentralized government”.142 The first issue was
based on what would the specific roles of the ruler, other executive organs, and
legislative branches be with respect to religious affairs, as this document attempted to
separate state and faith. The second disagreement was in regard to whether or not
government would be more centralized or would become decentralized. Midhad wanted
a more decentralized central government than did Abdulhamid. This issue had divided
the reformists since the reign of Mahmud II. Contrary to Midhad’s views of a
decentralized government, Abdulhamid believed a centralized government was
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necessary. One of the reasons Abdulhamid gave for maintaining a more centralized
government was to have more control over limiting Russian expansion into Ottoman
territory. But as events were to prove, Abdulhamid also wanted to maintain the apparatus
of despotism and he wanted as well to base his authority squarely on the traditional
principles of the Sultan as an Islamic ruler of a Muslim Empire.143
Furthermore, in Midhad’s proposal for a constitution, the parliament would be
made up with a composition of all nationalities, religious affiliations, and ethnicities. The
government, through the parliament, would be responsible for providing the same rights
and treating all people as equals. In addition, Midhad’s proposal gave provinces, which
were not of a Muslim/Turkish majority, a semi-autonomous administration, more so than
many other pro-constitutionalist wanted. In respect to these decentralizing views,
Abdulhamid’s was not so much against the composition of the parliament, rather he was
not fully on board with Midhad’s proposal dealing with provinces which did not have a
Muslim/Turkish majority. Abdulhamid had a pro-Arab policy. Throughout the reign of
Abdulhamid, non-Muslim representation was not a priority. Ottoman reformers never
outlined in the constitution that there had to be a proportional representative assembly of
non-Muslims, which means there were not many non-Muslims elected to the
representative assembly during the reign of Abdulhamid.144
The issue dealing with the creation and promulgation of a constitution was
threefold. The first was in regard to faith and state and how the two would be separated.
The second issue was the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The third
issue was the relationship between Turks and non-Turks. The first issue was not a major
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concern for Abdulhamid. It was the second and third issues which Abdulhamid had a
problem in resolving. Abdulhamid and other pro-constitutionalists saw these proposals
as creating an environment for nationalist separatist movements, which it wanted to
avoid. According to Midhad, the purpose of the constitution was to create a stable
government, in which all people could participate. Abdulhamid feared Midhad because
he had successfully deposed two former Sultans, Abdulaziz and Murad.145
The dilemma above was a major issue for all pro-constitutionalists. In this sense,
Midhad’s proposal for a constitution would influence the Empire to become a secular
nation. However, many within and outside of the government disagreed with this belief,
such as Abdulhamid and, the growingly famous literary figure, Namik Kemal, who will
be discussed below. Both Abdulhamid and Namik Kemal viewed constitutionalism as a
dangerous process leading to weakening the Islamic character of the Empire. This
attitude came from recognition that these liberal ideas on which constitutionalism was
based had their origins in Europe. Most Muslim Ottomans at this time were still not
entirely sure of the motives of the West, regarding why the West had such an interest in
promulgating a constitution in the Empire. Therefore, many people believed there were
anti-Muslim/anti-Turkish ideas embedded within the context of the liberalism which was
being transferred into the Empire.146
As a result of these feelings, many people were not supportive of Midhad’s
proposal for a constitution. Riding with this wave of resentment toward Midhad,
Abdulhamid was successful in promulgating a constitution, which aligned itself with his
belief. The constitution, which was passed on December 23, 1876 did not focus on

145
146

Davison, “Midhat Pasha,” 6: 1033b.
Berkes, The Development, 231.

44

protecting the rights of people.147 Instead it focused on protecting the rights of the
sovereign, meaning the government was much more centralized than initially intended by
the pro-constitutionalist and the Young Ottomans. Even the manner in which the
constitution was passed was against the ideology of the Young Ottomans. The
constitution was created and passed by the Sultan, Abdulhamid, rather than being created
by an elected representative assembly. The constitution can be viewed with this
perspective, “The ruler was not bound by the constitution; the constitution was bound by
his will.”148
As mentioned above, the constitution did not fully succeed in achieving all of the
goals of the Young Ottomans and pro-constitutionalists, especially Midhad Paşa. Many
believed the constitution was promulgated in order to appease Europe and to keep Europe
out of the affairs of the Empire, rather than with an original intent of giving rights to the
people.149 In an attempt to appease Europe, Sultan Abdulhamid sent Midhad Paşa to a
meeting of ambassadors in Istanbul to elicit support for the constitution from Europe.
However, upon his return to the palace, Midhad was abruptly dismissed from his position
as Grand Vezir. Abdulhamid forced Midhad out of his position and out of the Empire on
the basis of Article 113 of the constitution, which gave the Sultan the power to exile
individuals whom he saw as a threat to the Empire.150
Midhad’s reign as Grand Vezir was short lived but his political career had been
outstanding; in fact, he is considered to be one of the most important bureaucrats during
the nineteenth century. However, his views on the constitution were different than those
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proposed by other pro-constitutionalists and Young Ottomans. Even though his ideas
may have been different, they were not totally out of context with the time period, which
saw an influx of liberal ideologies, derived from Western thought. His ideas however,
were not the same as those of Abdulhamid, and as a result he was exiled and dismissed
from his position. Once he was exiled, Abdulhamid choose a new Grand Vezir, one who
was more in line with his ideas and concepts of constitutionalism. This new Grand Vezir
in 1878 would be Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi.
Before Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi came into office, the constitution was in effect.
Throughout the year 1877, the constitution would help the Sultan to rule the Empire. The
parliament was split into two houses, a Chamber of Notables and a Chamber of Deputies.
The Chamber of Notables was appointed by the Sultan and would be considered a senate.
The Chamber of Deputies was considered to be the lower house of the parliament and
was to be elected.151
Once the Parliament was established it immediately began to strip powers from
the Sultan. For example, this parliament began the process of eliminating ministers from
office who were, in their opinion, corrupt. This in turn upset Abdulhamid and his
ministers. Abdulhamid insisted the act of appointing and dismissing ministers was his
prerogative. As a result, this first parliament was dissolved on June 28, 1877. The
Empire then underwent new elections and the second parliament met on December 13,
1877. Even this newly elected parliament did not fully support the Sultan’s wishes, and
he dissolved this parliament as well on February 14, 1878.152 After this, there would be
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no more attempts made to create a parliament under his rule. From this perspective,
constitutionalism and creating a representative government both failed.
The creation of the constitution and a representative parliament was an attempt to
create a government based upon European constitutionalism. Though some of the
Empire’s applications can be seen as being successful, in the long run the representative
assembly was dissolved. However, before the representative assembly was discontinued
in 1879, Abdulhamid appointed a leading advocate of constitutional government as
Grand Vezir, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi.
As the quote that follows indicates, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, in common with the other
official reformers of the Empire, was highly educated and conscious of his role in the
great transformation that was taking place throughout the Tanzimat.
I also assert openly the truth that any functionary who does not believe he
should be held accountable in his public office lacks trustworthiness and
sincerity to his state and country.153

Along with Midhad Paşa, Khayr al-Din was one of the more important official figures
of the Tanzimat. During his political career, he did serve a short tenure as Grand Vezir in
the Empire, and he was also a dominant official in the government of Tunisia which was
considered to be within the Empire, an autonomous province. He was born between 1820
and 1825, and died in 1889.154 In 1840 Khayr al-Din arrived in Tunis.155 It was here in
Tunis where he became an important figure in state and politics.
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While in Tunis, Khayr al-Din began his career as a statesman. In 1856 Khayr al-Din
had two great accomplishments, while serving in the Porte, as a faithful statesman of state
and religion. In 1856 he was appointed Minister of Marine, and shortly thereafter he
ascended to President of the Grand Council, established by Ahmed Bey. He held both
offices until 1862.156 In 1862 Khayr al-Din retired from both offices because of a
growing conflict with Mustafa Khazandar, the most powerful and long serving minister
of Ahmed Bey’s government.157 Between 1862 and 1868, Khayr al-Din lived abroad,
and wrote The Surest Path.158 In 1869 he briefly returned to a career in government and
became the president of an international commission in Tunisia. In 1873, Mustafa
Khazandar was finally forced from office and Khayr al-Din, who had become a favorite
of the Bey was appointed to the office of Prime Minister. As Prime Minister he initiated
reform programs along the lines set out in his book The Surest Path.159 He held this
position for four years, when he was once again dismissed from office in 1877 due to
palace intrigue, and left Tunisia again. This time he left for Istanbul and became the
Grand Vezir under Abdulhamid II.160 In 1878 he was selected by Abdulhamid II to
become Grand Vezir. His reign would not last long, though, for in 1879 he was
Ottoman Empire for three hundred years and it began to develop an Arab cultural character as opposed to a Turkish
one. At first the Ottoman Empire ruled Tunisia through direct rule; however, in the eighteenth century, Tunisia was
given semi-autonomous status, ruled by a bey, and had to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire in recognition of the
latter’s governing attributes.
156
Brown, “The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform” in The Surest Path, 30.
157
Ibid., 31. Mustafa Khazandar was also Khayr al-Din’s father-in-law.
158
Brown, “The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform” in The Surest Path 31. Khayr al-Din’s book The Surest Path was
written in 1867. Throughout this book Khayr al-Din wrote about reforming the Ottoman Empire using Western
ideas of government as models for reform. However, Leon Carl Brown in the introduction, (Brown, “The Khayr alDin Round of Reform,” (32) writes about Khayr al-Din’s memoirs, which he personally dictated to a French
secretary in 1888 and which were recorded in French. One of the major themes in the memoirs was, “an idea of
government which remained traditional throughout his life” (ibid., 32). For the purpose of this paper these memoirs
were not consulted for two reasons. First, I must admit, I can not read French. Second, his book describes his ideas
on reform when he participated in government. His opinions on state and religion in his book are much more
pertinent to the objective of this paper.
159
Ibid.
160
Hourani, Arabic Thought, 86.

48

dismissed and retired from service and political life, and lived out the rest of his life in
retirement in Istanbul, until his death in 1889.161
Before discussing Khayr al-Din’s ideas on reforms it is important to discuss his
book, The Surest Path. This book was written in 1867 and he expressed his ideas on
reforming the Ottoman Empire using Western ideas of government as models for reform.
This translation of his book is used here in analyzing his thoughts on reform. This book
provides great insight into how educated Ottoman Muslims understood and tried to
control the power of Europe in politics and culture.
Khayr al-Din’s ideas on reform were based upon the concept of westernization
rather than reforming the Empire according to traditional models of government, which
meant that the Sultan would rule the Empire according to God’s will. For example, he
was opposed to arbitrary rule and believed the Empire needed to reform its political
structure because this led to corruption. One of the major resources for these ideas was
the French Revolution, which began in 1789. Several of his ideas had their origins from
the French Revolution such as the role of government to guarantee justice, freedom, and
security. In order to validate his point of view in regard to reform, Khayr al-Din made
reference to Ibn Khaldun and his book The Muqaddima. He believed Ibn Khaldun was
correct in his assessment that oppression foreshadows the downfall of civilization.162
This is why Khayr al-Din was not a proponent of the concept of one person being in
control of the entire government. Rather, he thought the Sultan should have statesmen
and religious men to counsel him in his responsibilities as a just ruler.163 According to
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Khayr al-Din, arbitrary rule was not a type of rule which could work, and he cited the
example of Napoleon I. In regard to the rule of Napoleon I he writes,
In sum, we should heed his mistakes and avoid them. Then we, the
present sons of the homeland, may profit by a final lesson not to be
forgotten: It is never permissible that the affairs of the kingdom should
be given over to a single person.164

Throughout his book, Khayr al-Din makes several references denouncing the idea of a
single individual being in charge of the entire government.165
Furthermore, on the subject of consultation, Khayr al-Din had many ideas of
reform which he uses to validate that consultation be used rather than a single person
being in full control over governing affairs. Khayr al-Din’s views on this subject were
validated by other great Muslim thinkers. For example, he quotes Ibn al-‘Arabi, who
stated, “Consultation is one of the foundations of the religion and God’s rule for the two
worlds.”166 He even quotes the fourth rightly guided Caliph Ali who stated this about the
importance of consultation, “There can be no right behavior when consultation has been
omitted.”167 By using these quotes in his book, Khayr al-Din emphasized the importance
of consultation in political authority and policy making decisions. In addition, Khayr alDin also made sure to illustrate the importance in the concept of majority rule in political
authority. In order to illustrate his thoughts on this subject, he quotes ‘Umar ibn alKhattab who made succession to be the next Caliph a decision among six men, “If you
divide two against four, then decide in favor of the four”.168 All of these quotes used by
Khayr al-Din illustrate his believe in the importance of consultation and majority rule in
164
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the realm of political authority and in policy-making decisions. Consultation was to be
used as a way in which the power of the Sultan could be checked if the law was not able
to do so. It was a way in which a balance of power could be checked by those people
who were involved in governmental affairs and to end corruption.169
One of the most pertinent arguments during the Tanzimat was whether or not the
Tanzimat conflicted with the Holy Law? Khayr al-Din did not believe the Tanzimat
transgressed the Holy Law. He believed the Tanzimat should continue in its attempt to
improve the administration of the Empire along with preserving the rights of the people,
such as the rights of life, honor, and wealth. He also wrote that reforming the
administration of the Empire was another way in which the power of oppressive
governors could be checked by the people.170 He also believed that the ideas expressed
by the Young Ottomans (more later) were important issues, which needed to be discussed.
One of the more important issues was that the Young Ottomans, “continued to demand of
the state the most far-reaching liberty by means of law to be established and protected by
an assembly whose members should be elected by the people.”171 Khayr al-Din believed
the people who supported this idea on a representative assembly had the goal of
safeguarding and improving the Empire. He goes on to write that proponents of an
assembly were trying to improve not only the Empire but also the lives of the people
living within its borders.
However, Khayr al-Din had his doubts as to if this could really work in the
Empire. He thought the real aim of many of the members of the Young Ottomans was to
do away with the authoritarian style of government which existed in the Empire. He
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believed the people had lost faith in this style of government and were ready for a change
in the organization of political authority.172 Describing the ambitions of the Young
Ottomans, of which was the cause of many of his doubts as to whether or not a liberal
government and a representative assembly could be implemented in the course of
establishing a constitution, Khayr al-Din wrote,
Instead, they often showed a desire to draw closer to those of their own
race by complaining about the state’s official conduct and by stirring up
confusion. This is due to their being constantly subject to corruption by
foreigners who plant in their chests the seed of protection for purposes
which cannot be hidden. It is possible that the establishment of liberty,
in the way demanded above, before giving consideration to those
obstacles would merely facilitate these ulterior aims. Among the
requisites of liberty is the equality of subjects in all political rights, and
this includes access to the highest state positions. However, among the
important preconditions for granting this freedom is the greatest among
all of the subjects concerning the interest of the kingdom and the
strengthening of the state’s authority.173

Khayr al-Din goes on to write about his doubts in regard to the realization of an assembly
and of granting people new liberties. He writes implementing both of these would be
difficult because the Empire is divided into several ethnicities, all of which have their
own languages, religions, and customs. Most of these various groups did not even know
Turkish, which at the time was the state language. Due to these cultural differences,
dialogue between the several groups would be difficult if a representative assembly were
convened. Also Khayr al-Din wrote it would not be easy to award liberty to certain
groups and exclude other groups of these liberties because that would cause anarchy.174
In conclusion, Khayr al-Din wrote the biggest obstacle to the objective of the Tanzimat
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were the people of the Empire. However, he wrote that he hoped statesmen and the
ulema would work together in an attempt to implement these new liberties.175
He believed in a reformist policy based on Western models of government. He
knew that it was necessary to gain the support of the ulema if such a program was to be
successful. His book was thus in part designed as an appeal to the ulema to accept his
position on reform, which was to adopt European models and implement them in the
Empire. There were some components of European life which Khayr al-Din held to high
esteem and other parts which he dismissed. He admired European advances in such
fields as education, libraries, inventions, roads, and railroads. The one aspect of Europe
which he had no appeal for was representative government. He saw this type of
government as a means of controlling the central authority or ruler. Another one of his
objections to representative government was that he was certain “…Turkey was not as
yet ripe for the establishment of a national assembly on a nationwide basis.”176 This does
not necessarily signify he was against representative government; rather, he believed and
wrote that he did not believe the Empire was ready for such a radical change in
government.
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Chapter III
Unofficial Reformers: The Intellectuals of the Tanzimat Era
Introduction
While the official reformers, because of their control of government, were able to
implement or even force changes in the policies and the organization of the Empire, there
were also several key figures outside of the government, during the Tanzimat, who
deserve special recognition for their ground-breaking ideas which were to be influential.
This group of intellectuals had several names given to them. For example, Berkes refers
to this group as the Young Ottomans. Serif Mardin and Albert Hourani also commonly
refer to this group as the Young Ottomans or New Ottomans. Roderic Davison gives the
title of the Patriot Alliance or Ittifak-i Hamiyet to this group. The Young Ottomans’ goal
was to form a secret society with the aspiration of ridding the Empire of absolutism and
promoting constitutionalism.177
The first meeting of this group occurred in the Summer of 1865 at a picnic in the
Forest of Belgrade, which several intellectuals attended. These men wanted to take
action against the Ottoman government in order to facilitate reform in the Empire. All of
these men had several commonalities such as their knowledge of European civilization
and a concern for the Empire, which they saw as falling behind Europe more so each
year. Another similarity between these men was most of them had worked in the
Translation Bureau of the Porte, and as a result of their work here became educated on
European civilization including its culture, political structure, and its languages. This
group of scholars wanted to reform the Empire according to Western ideas of government
177
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and society. However there were to be many obstacles during the subsequent years,
especially from Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa. Among the original members of the Young
Ottomans were Mehmed Bey, who received an education in Paris and had return to the
Empire with the goal of trying to establish constitutionalism and popular representation.
Another member and maybe the most important unofficial reformer to come out of the
Tanzimat was Namik Kemal Bey, who early in his life gained fame for his abilities as a
poet.
On the day of their Forest of Belgrade meeting, the Young Ottomans decided their
objective would be to change the government of the Empire into a constitutional form of
government. They were opposed to absolutism, which they later made clear to Sultan
Abdulaziz and their intention to see constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire.178
Embodied in a document, this proposal to Abdulaziz was called Ittifak-i Hamiyet. Not
only did this document discuss the possibility of constitutionalism in the Empire, but it
also instructed Abdulaziz to take control of the government out of the hands of Ali Paşa
and Fuad Paşa. The ultimate goal of the group was to allow for popular sovereignty and
representative government, which would control the legislative branch of government
and would check the power of the executive branch and to form some variation of a
constitutional monarchy.179 Furthermore, the Young Ottomans supported a program of
reform which attacked the policies and the centralization of political authority, which was
supported by some of the official reformers of the Tanzimat.180 A discussion of the ideas
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of the most important members of this society— Mustafa Fazil Paşa, Ibrahim Şinasi, Ali
Suavi, Namik Kemal and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa—follows.

Mustafa Fazil Paşa
If religion does not remain in the position of eternal truths, in other
words, if it transcends into interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a
destroyer of all as well as of its own self181
Mustafa Fazil was born in 1829.182 As was the case with almost all of the
intellectual elite of the Empire, Mustafa Fazil had a privileged upbringing as part of the
ruling family of Egypt. This placed him in an interesting predicament in that his father,
Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt, and his brother, Ibrahim, were both enemies of the
Empire. Mustafa was in line to be the next ruler of Egypt however; on May 27, 1866
Egypt changed its succession laws and he was left out of the line of succession.183
Contrary to the history of his family, Mustafa Fazil Paşa was a supporter as well as a
participant of the Young Ottoman movement. In fact most of the early funding for the
group to publish and edit newspapers came from Mustafa Fazil.184
This is not what he is most known for, though. In 1867 Mustafa Fazil wrote a
letter to Sultan Abdulaziz, which was considered the foundation for public political
commentary in the Ottoman Empire.185 This letter was the first manifesto from the
liberal Young Ottomans, which stated explicitly their admiration for transformation in the
Empire. The letter was written in order to make aware the current situation of the Empire
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according to the Young Ottomans. They believed the decadence of the Empire and
European interference into Ottoman affairs was occurring due to unjust rule. This unjust
rule was a result of the lack of liberty in the Empire. Accordingly, it was not efficient
only to reform the Empire, rather a new liberal political regime needed to establish itself
in order to bring about a new liberal government.186 In addition to this problem, Mustafa
Fazil believed there were many other problems within the Empire which had some effect
in the current status of the Empire. He believed “depopulation, decline in Turkish virility
moral degeneration, loss of moral, intellectual stagnation, injustices and exactions of
subordinate officials, treasury crisis, and lack of industrial, agricultural, and commercial
development” were all problems which had to be dealt with in the Empire.187
The problem the Empire faced was how to deal with all of these issues in the
Empire, which was the purpose of Mustafa Fazil’s letter to Abdulaziz. The letter was an
attempt on the part of Mustafa Fazil to influence the Sultan to take action to bring about a
liberal regime, one which Mustafa Fazil and the Young Ottomans believed would be
necessary to secure the liberty of all people and to continue strengthening the Empire.
Mustafa also stated, unlike what some people believed that reforming the education of the
Empire was not a way in which all the shortcomings of the Empire could be cured.188
The only way to mend the Empire, according to the letter, was for a constitution to be
promulgated which expressed equal rights for all people. This is turn would change the
structure of political authority within the Empire, one which had been traditionally
engulfed with Islamic principles of rule.
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Mustafa Fazil set out in his letter a detailed plan as to how to change the basis of
political authority of the Empire. For example, Mustafa believed the provincial
assemblies should be freely elected by the people. Furthermore, he believed these freely
elected members should then form a national assembly, which would be used in some
degree like a parliament. This in turn, he believed, would guarantee equality for all
people of the Empire. As a result of this proposed equality and liberty, the loyalty, moral
basis of the society, economy, culture, and military would all be rejuvenated.189 The
objective of these reforms would be to bind the government and the people.190
This was indeed a radical departure from the traditional framework of Islamic
rule. Mustafa Fazil also believed the reforms implemented by Mahmud II, which
established a centralized political authority with an increase of control, was not the
correct steps of reform to implement. As a result of the centralization of authority by
Mahmud II before 1839, Mustafa Fazil believed the Empire was in effect ruled not only
by tyranny, but also by the Sultan’s ministers who were mostly dependent of the Sultan.
In other words, the Sultan no longer ruled the Empire. Also since public opinion was not
present in the Empire, these powerful ministers could work independently of the people,
whom they ruled.

An interesting aspect of Mustafa’s writing was the terms he used

such as, “tyranny” and also the term “tyrans subalterns” which he appropriated from
European political discourse.191 He used these terms in order to appeal to the intellectual
class within the Empire which had already expressed its aversion to these powerful

189

Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 204.
Mardin, The Genesis, 279-80.
191
Mustafa Fazil learned of these terms from Western political writers such as Vicenzo Gioberti. Prolegomeni del
Primato Moral e Civile degil Italiani (Brussels: Caus & Co., 1846). See Mardin, The Genesis, 281.
190

58

ministers.192 In Mustafa’s opinion the real purpose of creating a constitutional
government was to dismantle the amount of power these ministers had in governmental
affairs and to check their power by creating a responsible government, representing the
people. In other words, Mustafa Fazil had become convinced that the only remedy for
the political weakness of the Empire was to adopt European constitutional government.
In this context, it is important to describe the role in which Mustafa Fazil’s
representative assembly would engage in the formulation of political authority.
According to Mustafa the representative assembly would act in order to control the
abuses of the political establishment. For instance, he states the only role the Sultan
would lose would be the right to make wrong decisions, because the assembly would be
there to correct any mistake which could occur. This assembly would be strictly
consultative to protect the rights and liberty of the people it represented.193 In other
words, Mustafa Fazil’s understanding of how representative government worked was
either naïve or flawed.
The one aspect to take notice of is how revolutionary these ideas were in regard to
the traditional Islamic concept of political authority. Mustafa believed in a complete
severance of faith and state and made no reference to Islam being involved in
representative assembly. This view distinguishes him from other Young Ottomans in that
most of the members wanted to maintain some Islamic structure in the government. In a
sense the other members of the Young Ottomans wanted to Islamize Westernization,
while Mustafa wanted simply to Westernize the political authority. Lastly, Mustafa
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wanted the control of reform in the hands of the people and to create a government of the
people and for the people, no matter ethnicity, or religion.194
Mustafa Fazil led an active political life, beginning in Egypt and ending in the
Ottoman Empire. In 1875, a year before the promulgation of the constitution, Mustafa
Fazil died.195 Even though he died before a constitution could be promulgated, he was an
influential figure during the Tanzimat. As indicated above, he patronized other members
of the Young Ottomans, and helped finance their operations and their journals, when
these men were in Europe in exile. One of the Young Ottomans Mustafa helped was
Şinasi, who will be discussed below.
Şinasi
My nation is mankind, my country is the face of the earth.196
Şinasi was born in 1826 in Istanbul and was raised in a well-to-do family.197 He
received his early education in a neighborhood school, and then he became an apprentice
at the Bureau of the Tophane Imperial Arsenal, where he was trained in Arabic, Persian,
and French. In 1849 he went to Paris where he studied literature and public finance.198
Upon his return, Şinasi brought back new ideas which he learned from the West, and they
included Western-style patriotism and most importantly, new ideas on literacy and
writing styles.199
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Şinasi is best known for his efforts to promote literacy and reform writing styles
and is credited as being instrumental in the “birth of public opinion,”200 Şinasi is
accredited with introducing playwriting into Turkish literature when he wrote his first
play, Sair evlen-mesi.201 In addition, he also helped to bring into the Empire Western
examples of poetry. In 1859, he published Terdjame yi-manzume, which was a selection
of poems written by Fenelon, Gilbert, Racine, Lamartine, and La Fountain--all translated
into Turkish. According to E.J.W. Gibb, who translated numerous Ottoman Turkish
poets, his poetry “mark the turning-point in the history of Ottoman poetry”.202 However,
this is not what Şinasi is most known for in history. He is known more so for simplifying
the Turkish language and creating a new system of writing prose. For example, he
advocated and also used short concise sentences rather than elaborate and confusing
sentences, which were used by many of the elite class.203
However, Şinasi knew in order to reform the literacy and writing systems, he
would have to write more in order to promote his Western ideas. In light of this, he gave
his full attention to literature and journalism. His ultimate objective was to create a new
profession and a new style of writing and expressing ideas.204 In order to reach a wider
constituency, Şinasi created the first privately owned weekly newspaper, which was
independently administered and outside governmental control. The newspaper was
named Terdjaman-i Ahwal.205 According to one of his biographers, his association with
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Terdjaman was not to last long as he constantly disagreed with his colleagues and he
gave up his association with Terdjaman in 1861.206
Even though he left the Terdjaman-i Ahwal, he did not stop publishing
newspapers. In June 1862 he created his own journal called Taswir-i afkar, “which
became a platform for innovative ideas based on European-type rationalism and
technological reform for the salvation of the Ottoman state.”207 Among the issues that he
wrote articles on were,
urban problems, agriculture, industry, and governmental corruption, and
advocated the rule of law based on the rights of the people, political
rationalism secularization, and a system of governance sustained by
national sovereignty, freedom, and citizenship rights.208

These journal articles were where Şinasi developed his reputation as the man who gave
birth to public opinion. In these articles Şinasi developed new ideas and new ways in
which to articulate these ideas. Şinasi expressed ideas such as citizen’s rights and natural
rights of the people, such as their rights to life, honor, and property as expressed in the
Hatti-i Sherif of Gulhane. This would then allow all Ottomans freedom of expression
and gave birth to public opinion without their fearing repercussions from the government.
In addition, he began to articulate ideas of a constitutional government with
representative government. Also, Şinasi was the first to use the term “millet” to represent
“nation.”209
These ideas were new to the Empire and much criticism was directed toward
Şinasi especially from Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa, who were two of the most powerful
206
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statesmen of the Empire during the Tanzimat Era.210 In Şinasi’s attempt to reform the
literature and governing affairs of the Empire, he was joined by Namik Kemal in writing
articles for Taswir-i afkar.
No matter how many articles Şinasi wrote, he still had a problem to overcome,
that being the lack of literacy in the Empire. In order to overcome this dilemma, Şinasi
had to create a new system for writing prose that a majority of the people could read and
comprehend. Part of this change in writing style was to write short and concise
sentences. Not only were there structural differences, but there was also vocabulary
changes which also had to be implemented. For instance, he attempted to revise the
vocabulary, not according to Arabic or Persian traditions, but on the basis of the current
vocabulary of the people.211 By doing this, Şinasi anticipated that the Ottoman people
would be able to grasp this new vocabulary more easily because it was modeled
according to the people’s speech.
Şinasi in common with the other unofficial reformers combined literary pursuits
with what can be described today as political activism. Among the many
accomplishments of Şinasi were his ideas on constitutional government, his ideas on
people’s natural rights, his ideas on public opinion and his ideas on creating journals and
newspapers to express new ideas based on Western traditions. According to Serif
Mardin, one of Şinasi’s most important contributions to the development of political
thought in the Empire was his idea on people’s natural rights such as life, honor, and
property. Initially, Şinasi believed protecting people’s rights was important in order to
save the Empire from its current declining status. However, his perspective changed
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from an attempt to save the Empire from disintegration into protecting the people’s
rights.212
In addition to protecting the rights of the people, Şinasi also discussed the
possibility of creating a representative assembly in the Empire. According to Serif
Mardin, his views were very difficult to synthesize because he tended to disguise his
ideas of reform so not to be labeled as a person who sought to Westernize the Empire.
This in effect caused his ideas on representative government to be ambiguous in nature
and “…which weakened the foundations on which the Young Ottomans attempted to
build their intellectual constructions.”213 By analyzing his work, it can be perceived that
he looked toward the West for motivation, especially in the sphere of political authority
for he saw “…European intellectual advances and political conceptions as superior ones
which did not try to conciliate with Islam.”214 He felt the Empire should create a
representative assembly and separate the affairs of the state and religion because he did
not believe it would cause a problem within the Empire. However, Şinasi can be seen as
naïve in that he believed separating the two could be done simply, which could not be
further from the truth.215 According to Berkes, Şinasi was the leader of the early
constitutional movement. However, Berkes goes on to write that Şinasi realized the
unofficial reformers were to fail in their movement because they could not convey their
ideas to the “uneducated” and “unenlightened” people.216
However, Şinasi did not push these ideas further in a radical direction and he also
did not harshly critique the existing order. The one objective he did push strongly for
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though was the use of the Turkish language, rather than using Arabic or Persian. Şinasi
ended his career in a rented home in Istanbul where he established a printing press to
continue to republish his books. He died on September 13, 1871, 217 largely a forgotten
figure, but his ideas heavily influenced the next figure to be discussed, Namik Kemal.

Namik Kemal
Man is free. He always requires freedom. To deprive humanity of it is
as if one were to deprive it of food.218

Namik Kemal was born on December 21, 1840 in the town of Tekirdag. Kemal’s
early life was influenced at a young age by his family’s tradition of participating in
government service.219 Kemal spent his early childhood with his grandfather, who had a
lasting impression upon Namik, especially in regard to poetry. Not much is known about
his early life and his early education, but it appears that he was schooled by tutors and
went to a private school, Dar al-Ma’arif220 in Istanbul for about a year when he was
either twelve or thirteen.221
There is not much known about the early political life of Kemal, but Lewis states
that by the age of seventeen he was involved in government service, holding a position in
the Translation Office of the Customs Bureau222 Then at the age of nineteen he was
Secretary to the head of the Bab-i Ali.223 By the age of twenty, he was appointed to be
the assistant of the Chief Secretary of the Customs, Leskofcali Ghalib. Then, when the
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Chief Secretary was appointed to the Director of Customs in Tripoli the following year,
Kemal became a member of the Chamber of Translation Office of the Porte.
It is evident that Kemal was capable and was valued for his knowledge of French.
These attributes set him on the road to even higher office and in 1867, at the age of 27, he
was appointed to the position of Assistant Governor of Erzurum, in Eastern Anatolia.224
While holding these positions, Kemal was at the forefront of the reforms of the Tanzimat,
and he became influenced by the writing of Şinasi, so much so that Kemal learned French
in order to be able to inform himself more on the reforms of the Tanzimat. Like the other
intellectuals, Namik Kemal thus had wide experience in government service.
In the early 1860s Kemal joined forces with Şinasi and began to collaborate with
Şinasi in his journal Tasvir-i afkar. Kemal took over editing this journal in 1865, when
Şinasi left for France.225 When Kemal took over this position, he wrote about
translations, but then he began to write more about the Empire and its political situation.
His views soon angered the “authorities” and in 1867 he left for Europe, where he joined
other Young Ottomans in exile. In Europe, Kemal and the others spent their time in exile
in Vienna, London, and mostly Paris. While in Europe, Kemal would continue to write
in several journals which were circulated in the Empire, expressing his ideas of reform
for the Empire.226
One of the most important of these ideas was his idea on freedom or hurriyya.227
This term was used extensively during the 1860s by many of the Young Ottomans and
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Ottoman bureaucrats. For example Şinasi stressed the importance of freedom of
expression. Khayr al-Din believed in a government which established justice and
freedom. Namik Kemal on the other hand had a much more in-depth analysis of
hurriyya. He believed that freedom resonated most clearly around the idea of the
sovereignty of the people. This freedom for the people would be protected by the
creation of a constitution and by the creation of an elected representative assembly.
According to Kemal, “…justice means not only care for the welfare of the subject, but
respect for his political rights. These rights must be safeguarded by appropriate
institutions.”228 Another of the differences between Kemal and other Young Ottomans
was the way in which he tried to legitimize his idea of hurriyya. Namik Kemal expressed
the meaning of hurriyya as “natural developments from traditional Islamic notions, in this
way justice grows into freedom and consultation into representation.”229 However,
Kemal was naïve in his belief that hurriyya could be implemented in the Empire, thus
creating an Empire based upon principles of just rule and freedom, even if he legitimized
it through Islamic notions and sources. According to Kemal, the sole purpose of creating
a representative assembly was so it would guarantee hurriyya but at this point, late 1860s,
a true representative assembly did not exist in the Empire.230
In conjunction with his thoughts on personal freedom, Namik Kemal emphasized
ideas pertaining to the role of government and its power. He was able to express these
ideas because in September 1876 Kemal was elected to hold a position on the Council of
State, and then later on in November of the same year he held a position on a special
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committee. The objective of this committee was to create a constitution.231 Up to this
point, the government of the Empire remained centralized, and the Sultan or the Grand
Vezir, depending upon who was Sultan and who was Grand Vezir, controlled the bulk the
power and were able to use their power with relatively few checks upon it.
Kemal preferred to have a system of government which saw a separation of
power. With this in mind, Kemal used a French model to describe his system of
government. His government included three branches of government, which all had their
own responsibilities and duties. According to Serif Mardin’s analysis, the first branch
would be the Council of State. The duties of this branch were to prepare laws and also to
resolve any administrative issues which may arise. The second branch of government,
according to Kemal’s model, was the Senate. The purpose of the Senate was to approve
or reject laws which were prepared by the Council of State. The third branch of
government was to be the Lower Chamber. The main purpose of this branch was to
control the budget, which was also an issue throughout the Empire’s history due to
corruption and economic stresses.232
However, Berkes interpreted Kemal’s proposal for government differently than
Mardin. According to Berkes, Kemal believed there should be three branches of
government. The first branch of government was the Council of State. This branch was
composed of forty to fifty members, and its purpose was to draft bills and to “decide
upon the execution of administrative laws.” The second branch, which differs from
Mardin’s interpretation, was the National Assembly. The purpose of this branch was to
legislate bills which were passed by the Council of State, and this branch was also to
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control the budget. The third branch of government was the Senate. The purpose of the
Senate was,
…to act as a moderating power between the legislative body and the
executive power by keeping alive the maintenance of the basic laws and
the liberties of the people, and to ratify for promulgation all laws in these
terms.233

Though it is evident that there is some confusion as to what Kemal actually intended
governmental structure to be, it is clear that he believed that the objective of the
government was to ensure that the laws were enforced and also to make sure the Empire
continued to move forward. The role of the Sultan was to appoint members to
governmental positions and to support the government, for according to Kemal, the
Sultan’s powers would be limited by the laws created by the Council of State and then
ratified by the Senate.234
Clearly, Namik Kemal’s model of government was greatly influenced by
European, especially French models, and in accordance with this model he believed that
the government would only be able to function properly if the people gave the
government its consent. In order for the people to provide the government with its
consent, Kemal understood that the people needed rights and freedoms, as have been
described earlier. However, Kemal’s ideas on individual rights go far beyond his ideas
on freedom, hurriyya. Kemal has been described as one of the first Muslims to
understand the true meaning of liberalism, and the importance of the sovereignty of the
people, which was essential for there to be a legitimate constitutional political
sovereignty. Included with sovereignty of the people was the idea that government was
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responsible for providing rights and justice for its people.235 In order to be permissible,
“political sovereignty,” had to satisfy two obligations. First, it must be based upon the
people’s consent, as was mentioned earlier. Second, the government had to act in
accordance to the law.236 By implementing both of these attributes, Kemal believed that
the government would be a just government, where people could participate in and also
have a legitimate voice within its framework.
If one was to simply look at Kemal’s views on the creation of a new government,
then one must also look at his views on law, because these views were not as secular as
one might infer by looking only at his views on the role of government. According to
Kemal, the binding thread in the Empire was the şeriat, and the role of good government
was to fulfill and follow the şeriat. In other words, Kemal wanted Islamic law to remain
as a basic fundamental element in regard to law within the Empire.237 He also believed
the şeriat allowed for a constitution in regard to the foundation of government and the
rights of the people. In this sense he was against the process of secularizing law which
was underway throughout the Tanzimat. He was also against the establishment of the
secular courts in that he truly did not understand the purpose of these courts within the
framework of providing people with more rights and creating a just government.238
In other words, Kemal believed the establishment of secular courts did more
damage to the Empire than good. He argued that the secular courts damaged the legal
principles on which the Empire was created.
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The second reason why Kemal believed secular courts should not have been
created was because he saw the process of secularizing the legal institutions as providing
the West with the opportunity to challenge the historical significance and existence of the
Empire.239 He regarded Islamic law as the principle foundation on which a parliament
could function. He thought Islamic law permitted reforms to occur and this was the
easiest way in which to help reform the Empire.240 Kemal’s views on reform can best be
described as being half influenced by the West and liberalism, as witnessed by his views
on government, and half influenced by traditional Islamic society, as seen by his thoughts
and ideas on law.
Another important idea proposed by Kemal were his ideas on patriotism.
Kemal’s views on patriotism were wrapped around the idea of a fatherland.241 Kemal
viewed a fatherland as not being a geographical area per se, but rather a bond which
existed between individuals in which people share, “memories of ancestors, recollections
of one’s own youth and earliest experiences all had a place.”242 Kemal wrote:
The fatherland is not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of
a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the
conglomeration of various noble feelings such as the people, liberty,
brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one’s ancestors, love of
the family, and childhood memories.243
A fatherland gave an emotional significance to one’s own history, whereby one could be
proud of whom one was with respect to religion and ethnicity. This is an important
concept because it gave people a sense of pride; it encouraged people to be proud of
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whom they are and where they came from, in an attempt to bring the Empire together
under a specific rubric or cause. This rubric or cause was for one to be proud of being an
Ottoman. This was one of the first movements of pan-Ottomanism with Islamic
undertones embedded within its framework.244 This movement was an attempt to fuse
together all people who lived within the borders of the Empire regardless of gender or
ethnicity. The purpose of pan-Ottomanism was to create a feeling within the Empire of
solidarity, in which the government and a constitution would provide all people the same
rights as everybody else.
Kemal thus wanted to reform the Empire in several essential respects. One goal
was to instill a sense of patriotism in all Ottomans; he also wanted the Empire to continue
to progress in all areas. He wrote articles stressing the importance of simpler and more
concise writing which was closer to spoken language in terms of grammar and syntax.245
The purpose of this was to allow more people to read and understand the writings of the
elite members of the Empire. This is especially the case for laws. If laws were written in
a simpler form, then everyone in the Empire would have access to them and would
understand them.
Kemal took many of his ideas from the West, such as his ideas of a constitution
and a representative parliament, which he witnessed firsthand while in exile in Europe.
Kemal understood the Empire could not simply implement these European ideas the
Empire. Kemal believed the best way to reform was to stress the importance of Islam not
only culturally but also legally. This is one reason why he stressed that the secular courts
were not a positive reform. In the legal sense, Kemal believed the şeriat needed to
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remain the principle foundation for law within the Empire. By combining Western and
Islamic traditions within the Empire, Kemal figured he could reform the government
while still maintaining its Islamic tradition and practices.
Even after the parliament was dissolved, thus ending the Tanzimat Era, Kemal
continued working for the government. He held several government positions throughout
the Empire, though he no longer publicly advocated a program of political reform.
Rather he concentrated on his literary career. On December 2, 1888 Kemal died. Namik
Kemal was an important intellectual figure during the Tanzimat. Some scholars, such as
Mardin, consider him to be the most influential of the unofficial reformers of the
Tanzimat.246 He was considered the leader of the Young Ottomans, and wrote in several
journals expressing his ideas of reform. His ideas had reform at his heart, but also
included Islamic traditional underpinnings embedded within it. He truly believed the
Empire should not lose its Islamic character, because Islam was important historically
and culturally to the people of the Empire. This leads us to the next figure, Ali Suavi,
whose ideas in some respect were both similar and dissimilar to those of Namik Kemal.
Ali Suavi
To provide justice is the greatest, the first duty of government, for it is
the very reason of its establishment and a pledge of its continuation.247

Ali Suavi was born in Istanbul in 1839, the same year the Hatti-i Sherif of
Gulhane was promulgated. He received his early education at a rusdiyye and later
studied Islamic sciences at a madrasa.248 One of his first jobs was as a teacher in
Plovdiv, located in present day Bulgaria. However, he was dismissed for inciting civil
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disturbances during his sermons. After this incident, Suavi left Plovdiv and headed back
to Istanbul in 1866.249 In 1867, he began to write articles in Muhbir.250 These articles
were considered highly controversial, especially by the Grand Vezir, who in 1867 exiled
Suavi to Anatolia and also forced Muhbir to shut down.251 The government used the
Press Law of 1865, which established strict regulations for the press, and created a Press
Commission, which would enforce the new laws, to shut down Muhbir. On March 12,
1867 a notification was passed by the Ottoman government against Muhbir explicitly
stating:
A part of the local press, not recognizing the spirit by which journalism should be
inspired in the East, has made itself the passionate organ of all the extreme parties
and of tendencies essentially hostile to the general interests of the country… the
Sublime Porte therefore reserves the right, whenever the general interest of the
country may require it, to act through administrative channels and independently
of the law of the press, against those newspapers which do not recognize the
above-stated principles, whose observance is an essential condition of a national
press…252

After fleeing the Empire, Suavi found himself in London. It was in London where he
joined the Young Ottoman alliance, and met Namik Kemal and other members of the
Young Ottomans in exile in England.253 In London he continued to write articles for
Muhbir in which he expressed his ideas on political reform.254
As was the case with many Ottoman intellectuals during this time period, Suavi
“…oscillated between his loyalty to Islam (as faith and culture) and modernization (as a
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civilising and secular process).”255 He realized the Empire was in dire need for reform;
however, he was not entirely sure if that meant Islam had to be removed from state
affairs. Due to his commitment to maintaining an Islamic character for the Empire, he
challenged the value of European political ideas such as, popular sovereignty and
separation of power.256 Suavi had a particularly difficult time understanding the later of
the two because he believed a separation of power between din ve devlet, faith and state,
already existed in the Empire. He identified this as a separation of function, which was
permissible in Islam. Suavi then pointed to the separation of function that existed
between the muftu, the interpreter of the şeriat, the kadi, the judge, and the vali, the
governor.257 The role of the muftu was to act as the Legislative branch, the kadi was to
act as the Judiciary branch, and the vali was to act as the Executive branch. Each would
cooperate with the other but each operated independently of the other. Thereby, the close
relationship between faith and state, din ve devlet, would be maintained through the three
separate governmental offices cooperating with one another.258
On this basis Suavi advocated the establishment of three branches of government.
Each would be responsible for particular components of government. At the head of the
political authority, as the overall legitimizing force, was God. The şeriat was the law that
transferred God’s will to the people. The ulema were to interpret the şeriat. Lastly, the
rulers of the Empire, either the Sultan or Grand Vezir acting for the Sultan, were to be the
executors of the interpretive decisions of the ulema.259 This foundation for political
authority can be seen as inspired by early Islamic political thought as opposed to the
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implications of the Tanzimat and the views of many of the Young Ottomans. For
example, Şinasi advocated the replacement of Islamic political ideas and practices with
European political practices such as constitutional and representative government260
Furthermore, on the topic of political authority, Suavi also believed a
representative assembly was permitted by Islam. Unlike many of his Young Ottoman
counterparts, Suavi looked to early Islam to validate that such an assembly was indeed
allowed by Islam. Suavi defended his thoughts on this subject by providing three
examples from early Islam. The first was from the institution of hilf al-Fuzul, the second
was based on the principle of nazar fi-l mazalim, and the last was based on the ideology
of the shura.261 According to Mardin, the hilf al-Fuzul, “…was the name given to an
assembly which had gathered before the prophet Mohammed’s mission had become
manifest.”262 The purpose of the assembly was to protect the people of the different clans
in their commercial transactions with one another. In other words this was an assembly
created in order to protect the rights of individuals. In addition to the institution of hilf
al-Fuzul was the principle of nazar fi-l mazalim. This principle was, “…a widespread
Islamic practice establishing means for a recourse to justice whenever recourse to the
Şeriat, in itself, did not result in the redress of a wrong.”263 This was a way to check the
power of the executive and the Sultan in order to avoid tyranny. Lastly, there is the
principle of the shura. The shura, Suavi maintained, was an assembly which was used by
Caliph Omar (R. 634-644, C.E.) In this situation the Caliph would consult with
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prominent members of the community before making a decision.264 Using this historical
example, Suavi legitimated a representative assembly in terms of early Islamic practice.
His perspectives on political authority and organization, which he believed must
be primarily based on Islamic forms, went against the ideas of other Young Ottomans,
such as Namik Kemal. Due to their divergent views, the two of them separated. Kemal
went so far as to state that what Suavi was advocating went against the objective of the
Young Ottomans. However, this dispute did not prevent Suavi from continuing to
express his ideas on reform. In order to fully comprehend the difference of opinion on
political authority between Suavi and Kemal, it is crucial to compare their ideas further.
One major difference was that Namik Kemal emphasized the idea of popular
sovereignty and its implementation within the Empire, which Suavi did not agree with as
he insisted that Allah was sovereign. In addition, Kemal believed in nonviolence and
civil disobedience in attempting to reform. On the other hand, Suavi was willing to go
much further, not that he specifically endorsed using violence, he simply was not
opposed to it. Suavi saw two justifications for the right to rebel. First, he stated the
tradition of rebellion against the Umayyad caliphs and the early Abbasid caliphs.
Second, Suavi, pointed to the Qur’anic verse that Muslims have a responsibility to
conform to God and steer clear of evil. 265
Suavi’s ideas on reform were focused on three critical points. First, like the other
Young Ottomans, he wanted to bring about a movement of “new energy” to the Empire in
order to make drastic reforms that would facilitate the recovery process of the Empire.
Unlike other Young Ottomans, however, he refused to conform to constituted authority
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and even advocated rebellion.266 Suavi believed individual Ottomans should take
responsibility for their own actions. In common with Namik Kemal, he recognized that it
would be difficult to put these ideas into practice in a largely traditional Ottoman society
without education. For Suavi, education was crucial. In order to improve education in
the Empire, Suavi proposed all efforts should be made to improve the educational system
of the Empire until it was equal to European standards.267 Serif Mardin writes that Suavi
was absolutely against the traditional set-up of the educational system in the Empire as
well as the curricula of the schools, specifically the religious schools, and he wanted to
have a system of education which was as advanced as Europe.268
The one attribute which distinguishes Suavi from other unofficial reformers, was
his idea of nationalism and his patriotic belief in a “fatherland.” While Namik Kemal
also emphasized the importance of the fatherland, vatan, Suavi’s idea of the nation was
not one of being an Ottoman nation, rather of being a “Turkish” nation.269 He played a
pioneer role in spreading the idea of a Turkic identity and Turkish nationalism.270 His
ideas were not specifically for Ottomans alone. He intended them for all Turkic speakers,
especially those like the Tatars in Kazan’ (Russia), Astrakhan’ (Russia), and in the
Crimea Peninsula, as Suavi considered these people to be primarily “Turks” from an
ethnic and linguistic perspective rather than simply Muslims from a religious
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perspective.271 In his attempt to redefine the Empire as one based on the existence of a
Turkic nation, Suavi laid the basis for later developments of Turkish nationalism
especially in terms of identifying language and ethnicity as the basis of association, rather
than religion.
Another of Suavi’s objectives was to reform the education system. He proposed
schools should minimize instruction in Arabic and adopt Turkish as the basic language of
instruction at all levels and for all subjects .272 Furthermore, he also not only wanted to
codify the şeriat into Turkish, but he also sought for a translation of şeriat into Turkish.
However, his intentions for this Turkic movement were not clearly stated. He may have
wanted these reforms in order to bring about a “Turkish” nationalism; however, Serif
Mardin states, “…but this was more a function of his attempt to make knowledge
available to a large audience and simplify madrasa teachings than part of his
Turkism”.273 So this aspect of Suavi’s ideas had implicit, not explicit political
ramifications.
Similar to the rest of the Young Ottomans, Suavi lashed out against the ministers
of the Porte. One of his strongest criticisms for the ministers was the way in which they
treated the people. For example, the ministers expected people to address them as
“statesmen.” In regard to this Suavi stated, “The individual who comes to seek justice is,
like the vizier, a man. He is not the slave of the vizier. He does not come to beg for
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pity.”274 Suavi believed the şeriat treated people equally no matter their status in society,
and should be treated with the same respect as statesmen.
Thus while Suavi was an important political thinker, his ideas tended to be more
visionary or futuristic than those of the other thinkers. For example, his idea of a Turkic
nation was not to be raised and discussed seriously until the beginning of the twentieth
century with Yusuf Akçura. Yusuf Akçura identified it as the only basis upon which a
reformed and Westernized Ottoman Empire could sustain itself in the face of European
power and hostility.275 Nevertheless, he was dedicated not only to the religion of Islam
but its history and traditions as well. Although other Young Ottomans expressed Islamic
themes in their arguments, Suavi went far beyond the others. He wrapped his ideas under
a blanket of Islamic tradition, precedents, and Qur’anic verses so that some of his
arguments were perceived to be weak, especially when compared to those of Namik
Kemal. Suavi was a reformist but not in the same sense as the rest of the Young
Ottomans. His views are closer to those encased in traditional reform arguments, such as
not separating faith and state, din ve devlet. Furthermore, his political ideology is far less
liberal than those of Namik Kemal particularly in the sense of forming a parliament, the
basis of representative government, and popular sovereignty all of which were basic to
Kemal’s reforming ideology. However, he was a modernist in the sense that he wanted
to reform the education system of the Empire and simplify the language. His ideas of a
“fatherland” surrounding a new sense of nationalistic Turkish pride can also be viewed as
a modernist perspective.
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In conclusion, Suavi had a difficult time separating his ideas of reform and his
religious beliefs. This leads to a discussion of another important figure during the
Tanzimat, one who, like Suavi, also tried to blend Islamic and Western ideas, the
historian and alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa.
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa
The basis of laws and by-laws in every state is the civil code. As our
state was based upon the Şeriat, it should, therefore, be the basis for our
laws and by-laws and this idea was not very popular276
The last figure among the intellectuals to be discussed is Ahmed Cevdet Paşa.
Ahmed Cevdet is, in fact, a representative of both the official and unofficial reformers,
and could have been placed in Chapter II discussing the official reformers. However, I
have included him here because of the importance of his ideas on reform, which were
articulated publicly within the framework of the intellectual debates carried on during the
Tanzimat. Cevdet was born in 1822 in the small town of Lofca, in northern Bulgaria.
His family had a long history of serving the Empire as military, religious, or
administrative officials. Cevdet’s education was put into the hands of his grandfather,
Haci Ali Efendi, who wanted Cevdet to become a muftu. His early education was
dedicated to the study of Islamic sciences and the study of Arabic. This education was
acquired by means of studying with local ulema.277 This meant his early education was
one primarily based upon religious learning, not a secular education. However, at around
the age of sixteen, Cevdet became weary of the learning environment in the town. He
had a tough decision to make. Should he stay in Lofca and continue his education by the
ulema or should he move to Istanbul and continue his education? If he decided to move
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to Istanbul where would he continue his education, would he go to the newly established
military school, or continue his traditional Islamic education at the madrasa?278 Cevdet
decided to leave Lofca for Istanbul and continued his education at the madrasa. By
1845, at the relatively young age of twenty-three, Cevdet completed his schooling and
received his diploma, which made him a member of the ulema class. 279
Soon after Cevdet finished his schooling, he was approached by Mustafa Reşid
Paşa, at that time the Grand Vezir 1846-1848,280 in 1846 for assistance to help him
become better educated on Islamic religious law.281 He wanted to learn more about
religious law so that he could avoid conflict while trying to implement legal reform in the
Empire. Mustafa had learned of Cevdet’s academic excellence, and hand selected Cevdet
to tutor him. Cevdet accepted this offer, lived in Mustafa’s house, and tutored him until
Mustafa Reşid’s death in 1858.282
While living in Mustafa’s house, Cevdet learned first hand from his mentor about
state administration and politics. Cevdet during this time also received increasingly
important positions in the educational affairs of the Empire. Due to his obvious
intelligence and ability, along with his relationship to Mustafa Reşid, Cevdet was
appointed as a member of the Council of the Tanzimat, in 1857.283 In this position,
Cevdet was instrumental in creating the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, which
replaced the Council of the Tanzimat, and he became a member of this newly created
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council.284 This position was one of the most important positions in the government
bureaucracy involved with developing reform policies. He was to work in it until the mid
1860s, when he was faced with a decision as to whether to maintain this position or to
leave government and return to the ranks of the ulema full time. Cevdet’s career up to
this point was not what one would expect from a member of the ulema, that is. to be
involved in government in a capacity to propose and implement Westernizing reforms.
Most ulema were against the creation of new Western modeled institutions which would
replace the traditional Islamic ones.. Hence Cevdet’s choice was either he could return to
a career as a member of the ulema, or continue to work in the office of the Grand Vezir as
a member of the civil bureaucracy. In 1866 Cevdet decided to abandon his career as an
alim and devote himself to government affairs. This decision was made easier when
Cevdet was passed over to become the next seyhulislam, the head of the religious
establishment, because he was considered too liberal, that is Western, in his ideas.285
Henceforth, in his capacity as a full-time employee in the civil bureaucracy of the
Empire, Cevdet was able to express his ideas on reform and modernization without
fearing retaliation from his fellow ulema. In 1868, Cevdet was appointed to President of
the Divan of Judicial Ordinances, which in effect also made him Minister of Justice.286
During his reign as Minister of Justice, Cevdet was able to implement many of his ideas
on reform. While holding this position, he instituted law courses at the Ministry of
Justice for better instruction of judges and also for judicial procedure.287 Cevdet was also
involved in the creation of a new civil law code, which would be modern in application
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and appearance but would remain, at least in part, based upon the şeriat.288 However,
this view came under intense scrutiny from other officials. Some officials, such as Ali
Paşa, wanted there to be a newly created body of law, which would primarily use the
French Civil Code as its basis. Ali Paşa had gone so far as to create a committee whose
purpose was to translate into Turkish some sixteen hundred articles of the French Civil
Code.289 Others objected to the adoption of the French Civil Code, including Cevdet, and
wanted to remain true to the şeriat and wanted to codify Islamic law. After a long heated
debate, Cevdet’s views on reforming the law were accepted. He was then given the
responsibility of heading a committee, whose responsibility it was to compile a book of
law called the Mecelle.290 This collection of law included sixteen books, which Cevdet
worked on from 1869 until 1876. Cevdet remained as the Ministry of Justice until April
1870. By this time four volumes of the Mecelle had already been published.291
However, it is important to note that neither the Europeans, especially the French,
nor the ulema were happy with this decision. The Europeans were not content because
they believed the Empire was not attempting to reform, according to Western models, but
were rather simply using French law to supplement the şeriat. The ulema and specifically
the seyhulislam, were upset with this development because they believed the office of the
seyhulislam should have the responsibility of codifying the şeriat rather than Cevdet and
the office of the Minister of Justice.292

288

Lewis, The Emergence, 123.
Berkes, The Development, 167-68.
290
Ibid., 168. In Arabic it was called Majalla. For an analysis of the Mecelle refer to Siddik Sami Onar, “Majalla,”
in Law in the Middle East, ed. Majid Khadduri and H.J. Liebesny (Washington, D.C.: Brill Academic Publishers,
1955), 1: 292-308.
291
Bowen, “Ahmad Djewdet Pasha,” 1: 285a.
292
Berkes, The Development, 168-69. At this time the seyhulislam was Hasan Fehmi.
289

84

While holding several positions within the governmental bureaucracy, Cevdet was
able publicly to discuss his ideas on a constitution. While the debate over the
promulgation of a constitution was occurring, Cevdet came into conflict with Midhad
Paşa, who at the time was selected Prime Minister by Abdulhamid II.293 At this time a
constitution had not yet been promulgated and the debate over passing it was at a
deadlock. On one side of the debate was Cevdet. Cevdet believed a constitution should
be passed in order to check the power of the tyrants and power hungry rulers. Referring
to the recent accession to the throne of Abdulhamid II, Cevdet stated, “Now that a wise
and sane ruler has come to the throne there is no need for a constitution in the terms of
the Şeriat.”294 Therefore, Cevdet did not feel as though a constitution was needed in the
Empire because Abdulhamid would rule the Empire justly, according to the şeriat, and
would strengthen the Empire and help return it back to its opulence. On the other hand,
Midhad believed there needed to be a constitution in the Empire, regardless of whom
held the position of Sultan, and was furious with Cevdet’s comments. According to
Midhad, a constitution was imperative and the establishment of a parliamentary
government were both needed in order for the Empire to return to greatness. Midhad
argued that if both of these measures were undertaken, then the European powers would
not intervene in the affairs of the Empire, if they saw the Empire enforcing governmental
reforms.295 Midhad’s ideas on a constitution were vastly different than those of Cevdet.
As was mentioned earlier, a constitution and a representative assembly were both created
and promulgated.
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Much of Cevdet’s public writings advocating reform tended, not surprisingly, to
be focused on the role of law in the Empire. When considering law, Cevdet wanted to
maintain an Islamic foundation, but his views on the newly created secular courts were
based upon Western models rather than traditional principles. In fact, the creation of the
secular courts was partly his idea, which is surprising considering his religious
upbringing. He thought the secular courts were in fact compatible with Islam. In fact he
went so far as to say that secular courts were necessary in order to best implement the
religious provisions of the Mecelle.296 These new secular courts had their own Judiciary
and procedure. Included with this was a level of courts which would be used as an
Appeals Court.297
In addition to reforming the law and the court system, Cevdet also publicly
advocated reforming education. Most of these reforms undertaken by Cevdet occurred
while he was Minister of Education, a position he held from 1873-74, and most of the
reforms he implemented were directed to the secular component of the education system,
rather than to the traditional schools. One of the reforms implemented under Cevdet,
which was to have lasting impact was the introduction of new text books, one of which
he himself wrote which exemplified his ideas on educational reform. In it he attempted
to blend Islamic and Western knowledge which “…simplified geography and science that
were beginning to appear in the West; and yet it contained stories of the prophet and
exemplary Muslims and information about different religions.”298 In addition to new
textbooks, Cevdet also felt there was a need for trained teachers, who could teach

296

Berkes, The Development, 165.
Lewis, The Emergence, 123.
298
As quoted in Berkes, The Development, 174. The title of Cevdet’s book was Malumat-i Nafia or Useful
Knowledge.
297

86

students about secular sciences. In order to solve this problem, Cevdet wanted to expand
teacher-training schools.299 Cevdet felt teachers who had received an education from the
madrasa were qualified to teach in the secular schools. Teachers who had learned in
Europe and abroad were sought after to teach in the secular schools.300 However, Cevdet
failed to realize that these teachers with experience in learning from the West, were also
receiving jobs in the West to teach, rather than returning to the Empire to teach. In order
to combat this dilemma, Cevdet felt there was a need to create and expand not only
teacher-training schools, but also rusdiyye schools.301 This led, “…to the creation of a
teaching profession at the secondary rather than primary level, and contributed to the
points of differentiation which can be observed still.”302 However, the problem with this
was that the training of teachers was still being performed at the madrasa schools, rather
than at the rusdiyye schools and teacher-training schools.303
Throughout his life Cevdet always promoted a curious blend of progressive and
conservative ideas on reform. One of his objectives was to advocate for greater learning
among all people of the Empire. He also always condemned any demonstration of
ignorance or “self seeking” in the elite class.304 However, the tone in his writing changed
as he got older and wiser. At the beginning of his career, he criticized his contemporaries
and their shortcomings in an optimistic tone. However, as he aged, his tone for his
contemporaries became unsympathetic This change can be seen as a byproduct with his
quarrel with Midhad Paşa, who provoked Cevdet by mocking Cevdet’s inadequate
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command of the French language, thus impugning Cevdet’s understanding of European
thought.305
Regardless of the origin of his disparaging attitude, Cevdet was a more than
capable writer. Among his works were many historical monographs. Among his work
was a twelve-volume compilation entitled Kisas-i Enbiya we-Tawarikh-i Khulefa. This
book was a history stemming from Adam and Eve and ending with the reign of Mahmud
II. He also wrote another history which deserves special recognition, called Ta’rikh-i
Djewdet or Cevdet’s History, which was a comprehensive work covering the period
1774-1826. In addition to his histories, Cevdet also wrote poetry, textbooks, and books
on Turkish grammar.306
Cevdet’s ideas on reform, especially in the realm of legal reform, were important
aspects of the intellectual discussions that took place during the Tanzimat. His ideas
continued to exercise influence, especially after the deposition of Abdulhamid in the
Young Turk period following the Revolution of 1908. His influence can also be seen
during the secular revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and the 1930s.
He is an especially interesting figure because of his religious education and background
and because, though he was an alim, he was a proponent of reforming the Empire
according to Western models.
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Conclusion
When Abdulhamid II first ascended to the Sultanate, he appeared to support
continuation of the Tanzimat program of reform as well as the ideas of the Young
Ottomans. While Sultan he rehabilitated many of the important historic public buildings
of the Empire including Islamic monuments such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem
and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.
However, in true Tanzimat fashion he continued aggressively to develop the
technological infrastructure of the Empire, building, for example an empire-wide
telegraph system and continuing to build railways. Among the most important and
dramatic railroad he built was the Hijaz Railroad. The ostensible purpose of this railroad
was to connect Istanbul with Mecca and Medina, so as to facilitate the annual Pilgrimage,
the Hajj, to Mecca.307

The latter was more truly indicative of his sentiments and his

intentions.
Though he was committed to developing the wealth and power of the Empire by
Westernizing its material and economic attributes, he also was committed to assuring that
it would be primarily an Islamic state and society, and he quickly abandoned his support
for the Tanzimat program of Westernization of society and culture, and so he soon
denounced the reformist ideas of the Young Ottomans. More concretely, in 1878 he
dismissed the representative assembly and suspended the constitution. This temporarily
ended the constitutional movement until the Young Turk revolt of 1908 ended his
authority and with it his program to emphasize the Islamic character of the nation.308
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Analyzing the Tanzimat Era and the period of initial reform which preceded it is
important in order to understand the modern history of Turkey after the Ottoman Empire
ceased to exist. Many of the reforms implemented during this period gave the future
leaders of Turkey the intellectual and practical foundation to transform Turkey into a
secular state and ultimately the democracy it is today. This paper analyzed the reforms of
the Empire beginning with Selim III and Mahmud II, who both attempted to reform by
centralizing authority within the Empire. Though their attempts of reform were not the
final answer to solve the problem of decline of power within the Empire, they were steps
in the correct direction, in that they and their supporters finally realized the Empire
needed to be reformed in order to bring it back to greatness.
After the reign of these two Sultans, the Empire was led into another direction of
reform beginning in 1839, when the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane was promulgated. This
document ensured the Empire would treat all people equally, and would protect the rights
of all its diverse populations. This document marked a watershed in the attempts at
reform, and ushered in the period which comes to be known as the Tanzimat. After the
promulgation of the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane, the official reformers, the rulers of the
Empire began wholesale reform of the traditional institutions of the Empire, hoping to
modify or even replace them with European models. These institutions included the most
important institution of an Islamic society, the law, the şeriat, the judiciary system and
especially the traditional system of political authority.
The main objective throughout this paper was to examine the reforms of political
authority within the Empire. Before the Tanzimat, political authority was in the hands of
either the Sultan, the Grand Vezir, or elements of the military such as the janissaries.
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One of the main objectives of the Tanzimat was to change the organization and
understanding of political authority. Rather than authority being centralized in the hands
of a few members of the elite bureaucracy, the official reformers tired to move toward a
system of constitutional government so as to elicit the support of the diverse populations
of the Empire. And the unofficial reformers, the Young Ottoman, attempted to introduce
new ideas, for the most part derived from partially digested Western liberal ideas. In
general the overriding purpose of the unofficial reformers was to change the traditional
system so as to allow all of the diverse peoples of the Empire to become active in politics.
Many members of the Young Ottomans wanted all citizens of the Empire to have
the freedom to participate in government. This would best be accomplished, they
believed, by creating a representative assembly or a parliament, where the elected
representatives of the Empire would vote on laws and policies to govern the Empire.
This representative assembly finally materialized in 1876 when a constitution was passed.
However, it was only to last for approximately eighteen months because it was dissolved
by Sultan Abdulhamid. After this, the sultan ruled as a traditional Muslim autocrat until
the revolt against the Sultan in 1908, which led to the restoration of the constitution.
The Tanzimat Era was important for several reasons in addition to reforming
political authority. Included in the attempts to reform the Empire were cultural and
linguistic reforms. Culturally, the unofficial reformers wished to allow all people the
same freedoms and to establish a society in which all people regardless of ethnicity or
religion were treated as equals. Linguistically, many of the Young Ottomans discussed in
their articles that the difficult Ottoman language should be simplified so that more people
could read Ottoman Turkish, other than the elite bureaucracy. For example, some of the
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Young Ottomans wanted the laws of the Empire to be written in such a way that all
people could read and understand them. This meant the orthography and grammar had to
be reformed
Though Ataturk set Turkey firmly on the road to secularization and
Westernization, the central issues of the Tanzimat remain alive in Turkey to this day: Is
Turkey, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, to be both Western and Muslim at one and
the same time, and how much of each? Even though geographically Turkey is in the
Near East, and its current government is dominated by a political party with extreme
Islamic underpinnings, there is little question that the country wishes to join the European
Union. If accession to the European Union is granted, this would have a dramatic effect
on the country in that its political identity as a member of the European Union would
seem to transform it from a Muslim Near Eastern nation to a Western Muslim nation.
This possibility has led to another inevitable debate over reform. How can the nation
remain true to its Islamic traditions, and how much can the country reform according to
Western models? The Tanzimat continues to influence modern Turkey.

92

Glossary

Auspicious Incident. The destruction of the Janisarries by Mahmud II in 1826. See Lewis, The
Emergence, 79.
Basvekil. Chief Minister. See Berkes, The Development, 97.
Caliph. Title given to a person who was the “Commander of the Faithful.” The Caliph is
elected or nominated, and can also be nominated by the incumbent Caliph. After this is
done the chosen Caliph is accepted by the community. According to John Esposito, the
Caliph must have many qualifications including: “justice, knowledge to interpret and apply
the law; virtuous character, courage to wage war, good physical health, and, finally, descent
from the Quraysh-the Prophet’s tribe.” The duty of the Calpih is to enforce the Shari’ah or
holy law, and is considered to be the protector of Islam. See Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th
Edition, 31.
Chief Mufti. Leading Muslim judicial official who interpreted Islamic law. See Shaw and Shaw
History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 74.
Dar al-Ma’arif. “House of knowledge” (personal communication, David Thomas, April 17,
2006).
Dawlah. Traditionally “refers to the concept of state and is a central concept in the discourse of
the contemporary Islamists.” In Turkish the term is devlet. This term refers only to state
and not government. See Shahrough, “Dawlah” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern
Islamic World, 1: 353.
Din ve devlet. Faith and State. The formulaic term used to describe the traditional
relationship between religion and government. See Shahrough, Akhavi, “Dawlah” in The
Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 1: 353.
Grand Vezir. The head deputy to the Sultan was called “Grand Vizier.” The duty of this
position was to be the leading advisor to the Sultan, and in due time, he came to rule over
the imperial divan, “which was comprised of the ordinary viziers as well as other officers of
state.” “Although the Grand Vizier was often the effective ruler, it was only in the midseventeenth century that a permanent residence, separate from the Sultan’s palace, was
established to house him and the numerous departments under him. As the new center of
government, the “sublime Porte” (Bab-i Ali), as the residence was called, quickly became
synonymous with the state itself.” See Zilfi, “Vizier” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern Islamic World, 4: 306.
Fatwa. Written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition. See Gordon, “Shaykh Al-Islam”
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in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume, 4: 54, or
Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Fatwa” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic
World, 2: 8.
Hatt-i Sherif. A Hatt-i Serif , that is a “Noble Rescript” is a decree written or signed by
the Sultan or “executive order” in contemporary American usage. See Shaw and Shaw,
History of the Ottoman Empire Volume, 2: 490.
Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane. Document written in 1839 which promised equality and rights to all
Ottoman citizens, and is considered the document which ushered in the Tanzimat. Gelvin,
The Modern Middle East, 333.
Hurriya. Hurriya is derived from hurr meaning “free” corresponding to Hebrew hur, Aram, her,
and widely used in many other languages other than Arabic. In pre-Islamic times “free”
meant the opposite of “unfree” or “slave.” Furthermore, the word also had a connotation
meaning “noble” of character and behavior. See Rosenthal “Hurriyya” in Encyclopedia of
Islam, 3: 589a.
Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun was born in 1332 and died in 1406. Ibn Khaldun gained much
admiration with his political thoughts about Arab social structures and their processes.
Khaldun was born in Tunis. This area of North Africa was under the control of the Muslim
Empire. At the time that Khaldun lived, he saw the Muslim empire in decline. The politics
of the Muslim empire were feeble and unstable at best. Throughout his life he held many
prestigious positions such as secretary of state, ambassador, and was at one time a judge. It
was these positions that gave Khaldun a podium to voice his opinions on Arab society. It
was through these opinions that facilitated Khaldun’s ideas of a new science, the science of
social organization (ilm al-umran). Within this context, Ibn Khaldun refers to many social
groups, but he considers the nomadic tribes or primitive cultures to have the greatest
potential to acquire large-scale political power. According to Khaldun, nomadic people
have more asabiyyah, or nationalism, than other social groups of that time. He asserts that
nomadic people will follow their ruler and their religion to death if called upon to do so.
Nomadic people are also, according to Ibn Khaldun, more willing to go to the extreme in
order to achieve social solidarity or sovereignty. See Baali, “Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd AlRahman” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 164.
Janissaries. The Janissaries, or Yeniceri in Turkish, were created in the late fourteenth century.
Before the creation of the Janissaries, the military of the Ottoman Empire were free Muslim
Ghazi warriors; however, the Janissaries were an elite slave infantry. Some of the
Janissaries were recruited through the devsirme. Devsirme was when the officials of the
Empire went into the conquered territories, especially in the Balkans, and recruited the smart
young Christian boys in the region and brought them back to the capital. Once in the
capital, they were converted to Islam, and then they were schooled. Some of the boys after
their education was completed went into the bureaucracy, while others went into the military
system. In return for their military services, the members of the Janissaries were given
special privileges, such as tax-exempt status. In addition to fighting wars, another purpose
of the Janissaries was to keep the peace between Muslims and non-Muslims within the
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borders of the Empire. After centuries of existence, the Janissaries became extremely
powerful. They became active in the politics, they joined guilds, they became active with
locale Ulema, and they entered businesses. After 1640, the recruitment of Christian boys
ended, and the Janissaries were replenished by free Muslims and sons of current Janissary
members. As a result, their numbers grew exponentially and their demands grew at the
same rate. They demanded pay increases, and this led to revolt against the Sultans. Also,
the Janissaries became extremely corrupt, and this is one reason why Selim III decided it
was necessary to rid the Ottoman Empire of the Janissaries. See Griswold, “Janissaries” in
The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 367-68.
Kanuns. The legal codes promulgated by the Sultan. See Lapidus “Sultanates and Gunpowder
Empires The Middle East”, in The Oxford History of Islam, 383.
Law. The idea of law is usually described by two key terms. The first of these is fiqh, which is
any attempt to “elaborate details of the law, to state specific norms, to justify them by
reference to revelation, to debate them, or to write books or treatises on the law are
examples of fiqh. The word connotes human and specifically scholarly activity.” Followers
of fiqh try to delineate and give expression to the Shari’ah, which is the second key term in
regards to defining law. The Shari’ah, which “refers to God’s law in its quality as divine.
“It also refers to God’s law as it is with him or with his Prophet, or as it is contained within
the corpus of revelation.” The Shari’ah displays loyalty and a focus of faith for all Muslims.
See Calder, “Law” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 450.
Madrasa. An establishment of learning where the Islamic sciences are taught, also known as a
college for higher studies. For more see Mona Abaza “Madrasah”, in The Oxford
Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 3: 13-16.
Malumat-i Nafia. Translated as Useful Knowledge. See Berkes, The Development, 174.
Mecelle. In Arabic it was called Majalla. This was the law book created in part by Cevdet
Pasha. See Berkes, The Development, 167-68.
Millet system. The way in which the Ottoman Empire allowed religious minorities control over
their own affairs, including education and judicial affairs and was headed by a religious
figure. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 335.
Muhbir. “The Reporter.” See Mardin, The Genesis, 361.
Nizam-i Jedid. In Ottoman Turkish means the new organization, that is the new (military)
formation. See Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New, 127.
Rusdiyye. High schools established in 1838 for men and 1858 for women. See Shaw and Shaw,
History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 507.
Sair evlen-mesi. “The Wedding of a Poet.” See Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 184.
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Şeriat. The Turkish spelling of Shari’ah. See Berkes, The Development, 9.
Seyhulislam. This is the Turkish form of writing seyhulislam. This title first appeared in the late
tenth century, well before the Ottoman Empire was established. Contrary to this, however,
the title did not gain much acceptance or popularity until after the Ottoman Empire began to
use it. Within the Ottoman government, the seyhulislam was the “chief mufti” or
“jurisconsult” and was the head of the ulema. Among his duties was to order fatwas or
“written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition.” These fatwas were not only related
to legal or religious questions but also government policy. In addition to the religious and
legal duties, the seyhulislam was also an advisor to the Sultan, making the position very
important religiously and politically. See Gordon, “Shaykh Al-Islam” in The Oxford
Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 54.
Shari’ah. Islamic law. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 336.
Sultan. Ruler. Title adopted first by the Seljuks in the eleventh century and then increasingly by
rulers thereafter, hence, the title Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. See Gelvin, The Modern
Middle East, 337.
Tanzimat. Means “reorganization” or “reordering.” Period of time in Ottoman history from
1839-1876 in which the government attempted to reform or modernize. See Mardin,
“Tanzimat” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 184.
Taswir-i afkar. “Chronicle of opinions”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 9:
443b.
Terdjaman-i Ahwal. “Translation of verses”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of Islam,
9: 443b.
.
Terdjame yi-manzume. “Interpreter of events”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of
Islam, 9: 443b.
Timar. In exchange for military service, the Janissaries were given land grants as the form of
income; this land grant was called a “timar”. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 337.
Ulama (singular ‘alim). Arabic term which means “man of knowledge” and is the plural form of
the word alim. Ulama refers to a class of men with knowledge of the Qur’an, Hadith, and
fiqh. They retained this knowledge by either tutelage with other scholars, or by attending a
madrasah, or school. While attending a madrasah, students learned about Islamic sciences.
See Zaman, “Ulama” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 258-59.
Vatan. “Fatherland.” See Mardin, The Genesis, 326.
Vekils. Ministers. See Berkes, The Development, 97.
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Vezir. This term is derived from the Arabic and Persian “wazir,” “vazir,” and Turkish “vezir.”
The term means “bearer of burdens” or “minister”. The role of a “vizier” was to advise the
Sultan in military and civil matters. Zilfi, “Vizier” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the
Modern Islamic World, 4: 306.
Young Ottomans. Group of nineteenth century intellectuals who advocated on some level
Islamic modernization and constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire. See Gelvin, The
Modern Middle East, 338.
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Notes on Sources
The sources used in this paper consist mostly of secondary sources as I do not
have the linguistic capacity at present to read Turkish-language primary sources. I have,
however, used English-language primary sources whenever possible. These include The
Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, written by Sari Mehmed Paşa and translated
by Walter Livingston Wright Jr. This book was significant for the writing of this paper
because it provided an example of an individual who lived and wrote during the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and who had detailed knowledge of the
government of the Ottoman Empire as a result of his long service in the upper levels of
the Ottoman bureaucracy. His book illustrated vividly the traditional perspective on what
caused the weakness of the Empire and what was needed to reform the Empire. This
book allowed me to understand why reforming the Empire according to traditional
foundations was a pathway to restoring the Empire to greatness. Sari Mehmed’s ideas on
reforming the Empire were used in this paper to show the traditional, pre-Tanzimat
perspective on reforming the Empire, rather than using Europe as a model.
Another primary source which was used was The Surest Path written by Khayr alDin and translated by Carl Leon Brown. This source was very important because it
allowed me to understand the reformist ideology of an important Muslim statesman of
wide experience during the Tanzimat. This book was used to provide insight into how
the Empire should reform using Western ideas on reform and government. Khayr al
Din’s and Sari Mehmed’s books provided a comparison between the two different
ideologies behind reforming the Empire, and made it easier for me to understand the
importance of the Tanzimat.
In addition to these, I also utilized a variety of other, briefer primary sources.
These included the texts of the two reforming decrees of 1839 and 1856 and extracts of
the writings of the unofficial reformers, as I have chosen to identify them.
In addition to the primary sources, which were instrumental, there were five
significant secondary sources that I used extensively and that deserve special attention.
The first was The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. This four-volume
encyclopedia set was important to consult, not so much so for article content but for the
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bibliographies at the end of each article. The bibliographies provided me with other
sources which could be examined. I must admit that I used this encyclopedia in order to
describe many of the technical terms fielded throughout this paper. This is especially
true for the terms in the glossary. The second source consulted was the CD-ROM version
of the Encyclopedia of Islam, available in CD-ROM form in Adams. The Encyclopedia
of Islam is considered to be the most authoritative scholarly reference source for all
aspects of Islamic studies. The articles I used included “Namik Mehmed Kemal,”
“Midhat Pasha,” “Shinasi,” “Ali Su’awi,” “Ahmad Djewdet Pasha,” and “Hurriyya,”
Both The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World and the Encyclopedia of
Islam were essential for researching and writing of this paper, especially in terms of the
biographical articles on the figures of the Tanzimat.
The next most important group of sources used during the research and writing of
this paper were a series of monographs, all published during the 1960s. These include
The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought by Serif Mardin. This book was an excellent
source for two reasons. First, this book was useful when researching the ideas of reform
by many of the figures in this paper. Mardin’s book, for example, provided detailed
information on Namik Kemal, Şinasi, Mustafa Fazil Paşa, Ali Suavi and Khayr al-Din.
Furthermore, the organization of the book was also crucial for the purpose of this paper.
Even though this paper is organized differently than Mardin’s book, his book was
organized in such a way that not only did it help to synthesize the information but it also
influenced how I choose to organize my paper. A second monograph that was heavily
consulted is The Emergence of Modern Turkey by Bernard Lewis. This book specifically
was crucial in understanding the context for policies and ideas of reform during the
Tanzimat. A third extensively used monograph is The Development of Secularization of
Turkey by Niyazi Berkes. This book, similar to Lewis’s, was crucial not only for
information pertaining to the figures of the Tanzimat but also for the background
information for why these reforms were crucial to the Empire. However, Berkes
discusses more extensively--and often with reference to the primary sources themselves-the policies and ideas of the Tanzimat. Another important monograph is Arabic Thought
in the Liberal Age 1789-1939 by Albert Hourani. This book was used to obttain
information on several of the figures of the Tanzimat and also for figures--though not
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specifically mentioned in this paper--significant during the time period, such as Jamal alDin al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Tahtawi. This book was valuable because it
also discussed reform in other areas of the Muslim world, including Egypt and Tunisia.
This showed that the reform movement was not exclusive to the Ottoman Empire, but
was a movement which involved all areas of the Middle East. The last monograph to be
discussed is History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II by Stanford
Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. Though many scholars have criticized this book for its lack
of content analysis, this book was useful for its abundant background information. This
monograph provided me with useful information on all aspects of the Tanzimat especially
in regard to the technical information about the legal and other Tanzimat-era reforms.
In the research for this paper, I also used several scholarly articles, some of which
did not make it into the paper. There were two articles written by Carter Findley that
were consulted. These two articles were “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle
East. Part I and Part II.” Even though part I of this article was not included in this paper,
both were consulted in order to provide essential background information ranging from
the eighteenth century to the twenty-first century. Another important article that was
consulted was “The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet
Paşa” written by Richard Chambers. This article was very useful in providing
information about the educational background for Cevdet Pasha. A third article that was
very useful for background information was “The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane
Rescript,” written by Abu-Manneh, Butrus. This article was most useful in providing
information on the Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane and providing information about the author
of the document Mustafa Reşid. This article also provided a perspective on what might
have influenced Mustafa Reşid while he was creating this document.
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